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COURT REFORM, TEXAS STYLE
by
Clarence A. Guittard*
R EFORM of the judiciary has been a perennial theme among Texas
lawyers. In July, 1918, the Texas Bar Association, meeting at Wich-
ita Falls, heard an address by Roscoe Pound on "Judicial Organization"'
and adopted the report of a special committee proposing to replace article
V of the Constitution of 1876 with a judicial article that would be con-
sidered advanced, even by the standards of 1967. The proposal embodied
the principles of unification, flexibility of jurisdiction and assignment of
judicial personnel, and responsible supervision of the entire system by the
supreme court, all as recommended by Pound.!
In support of this proposal, the association published a pamphlet point-
ing out the need for judicial reform in emphatic terms:
The public is in open rebellion. The best of our judges, working in the
present machine, cannot always administer justice. The rightful compen-
sation of lawyers is enormously decreased, their labors increased, by the
intolerable expense, complication, delays and uncertainties inherent in the
system. To a great extent the courts are being abandoned, because men
would rather submit to wrong than litigate. Therefore the general public,
and the professional, demand is for reform, and if the legal profession does
not with careful deliberation bring forth a plan, it is inevitable that crude
and injurious plans will be advanced, and probable that some of them will
be adopted.'
Almost fifty years have passed since these words were published, and
article V remains substantially intact. Yet no similar outcries are being
heard today from any responsible group in the Texas bar. Our judicial
structure has not broken down, antiquated though it may be. It has proved
more adaptable to change than anyone would have had reason to suspect.
The worst evils predicted have-never quite materialized. Docket conges-
tion, for instance, has never been and is not now as serious in Texas
courts as it is in many metropolitan areas in the country." Important
progress has been made toward efficiency in the operation of the Texas
courts but broad and sweeping changes have not been our style of re-
form in the past, and probably will not be in the foreseeable future. The
discussion which follows will indicate something of the Texas pattern of
progress-a gradual process of specific constitutional amendment and
statutory enactment. Although this process may not satisfy the advocates
•B.A., LL.B., Baylor University. Judge, Fourteenth District Court, Dallas, Texas.
37 TEx. BAR Ass'N PROCEEDINGS 69 (1918).
21d. at 150; resolution adopted, id. at 228. Justices of the peace were to be replaced by courts
of record presided over by lawyers, district judges were to be authorized to sit together or sepa-
rately, terms of court were to be abolished, and times and places of holding court were to be de-
termined by a committee of judges.
3 2 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 133 (1919).
' See INST. JUD. ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS STUDY-1966, STATE TRIAL COURTS OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION, PERSONAL INJURY CASES (1966).
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of thoroughgoing reforms, perhaps the reformers would do well to con-
sider more modest alternatives to make sure that our judicial structure
is capable of dealing with the new problems which an expanding popula-
tion and the litigation explosion will inevitably bring.
I. GOALS OF COURT REORGANIZATIONS
Before reviewing the reforms of the past or anticipating those of the
future, it may be helpful to define some of the goals upon which pro-
ponents of judicial reform are generally agreed. The great American au-
thority in this field was, of course, Roscoe Pound, whose celebrated ad-
dress to the American Bar Association in 1906 on "The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,"' is generally credited
with initiating the movement for judicial reform in this country.' In that
address Pound pointed out that the American judicial structure was ar-
chaic in its multiplicity of courts with rigid districts and limited jurisdic-
tions. He called attention to the unified court system under the British
Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875' as the model for modern judicial or-
ganization. In 1909 Pound was a member of a committee of the American
Bar Association which proposed a thorough reorganization of American
courts on the British model.' According to the recommendations of this
committee, there should be one great court with three branches: a county
court branch to try petty offenses and hear small causes, a superior court
with general original civil and criminal jurisdiction, and a court of appeal
with general appellate jurisdiction. All judges should be judges of the
whole court and should be assigned administratively to some particular
branch or division, but should be eligible to serve wherever their services
were most needed. The administration of the court should be supervised
by a judicial officer, preferably the chief justice of the ultimate court of
appeal, who would have responsibility to see that the manpower of the
court was used effectively. He would have the power of assignment of
judges and of causes, and for each branch or locality a local judicial of-
ficer would have the same power, subject to his supervision.
The three principles of unity, flexibility, and administrative supervision
within the judiciary embodied within the above recommendations, have
been features of practically every court reorganization plan seriously ad-
vanced since that time, including, as we have seen, the proposals of the
Texas Bar Association in 1918."° They were included in the recommenda-
tions for improvements in court organization, administration and proce-
dure adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion in 1938"1 and in the Model State Judicial Article approved by the
5 35 F.R.D. 273 (1964); 29 A.B.A. REp. 395 (1906).
'Calvert, Problems of Judicial Administration, 25 TEXAS B.J. 639 (1962); Wigmore, The
Spark That Kindled the White Flame of Progress, 46 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 50 (1962); Proceedings
Honoring Roscoe Pound, 35 F.R.D. 241 (1964).
7 Judicature Acts, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (1873), 39 & 40 Vict. c. 77 (1875).
s ABA, Special Committee To Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws To Prevent Delay
and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation.
934 A.B.A. REp. 578 (1909).
10 Note 2 susra.
" 24 A.B.A.J. 726 (1938).
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House of Delegates in 1962.1" They have been advocated by the Ameri-
can Judicature Society since its very beginning."3 More recently they have
been included in the recommendations of the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. "
All major court reorganization measures which have been enacted in
the last half century have adopted the same basic approach. Congress has
led the way by reorganizing the federal judiciary." Among the states the
pioneer effort was the New Jersey reform of 1947."5 New judicial articles
establishing unified court systems have also been adopted in Arizona,'
New York,8 North Carolina," Illinois,"M and Colorado," as well as in the
new states of Alaska' and Hawaii."
II. TEXAS PROPOSALS FOR GENERAL COURT REORGANIZATION
In Texas, proposals for general court reorganization, following the
same pattern, from the Bar Association's proposal of 1918 down to the
present, have not lacked for distinguished supporters, but have met only
hostility or indifference on the part of the legislature. Among leading pro-
ponents of Pound-style reforms may be mentioned C. S. Potts, 2" Samuel B.
Dabney," James P. Alexander," Robert W. Stayton,' Charles T. McCor-
mick, ' Robert G. Storey," Charles I. Francis," and Robert W. Calvert."
Judiciary reform has been a longstanding project of the Texas Civil Judi-
cial Council." In 1941 Chief Justice Alexander put the issue to the coun-
cil succinctly:
[W]e need a reorganization of our judicial system. Our present system is
composed of too many independent units, without any responsible head.
We should have a single judicial system which all the members thereof have
1287 A.B.A. REP. 130, 392 (1962); 47 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 8 (1963).
146 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 110 (1962); 3 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 131 (1919); 1 J. Am. JUD. SOC'Y
5 (1917).
'" PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 157 (1967).
"Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal System, 31 F.R.D. 307 (1963); Parker, The
Integration of the Federal Judiciary, 56 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1943); Unification of the Judiciary,
Federal and State, 1 TEXAS L. REV. 214 (1923).
'ON.J. CONST. art. VI; English, New Jersey Reorganizes Its Judicial System, 34 A.B.A.J. 11
(1958); Medina, Improving the Administration of Justice-Evolution or Revolution, 47 J. Am.
JuD. Soc'Y 51, 53 (1963); Milmed, The New Jersey Constitution of 1947, N.J. CONST. art.
XIII, N.J. STAT. ANN. xxvii (1954).
'" ARIZ. CONST. art. 6.
"8 N.Y. CONST. art. 6.
29 N.C. CONST. art. IV.
20 ILL. CONST. art. 6; Freels, Illinois Court Reform, A Two-Year Success Story, 49 J. Am. JUD.
Soc'Y 206 (1966); A New Judicial Article for Illinois, 45 J. Am. Jun. Soc'¢ 283 (1962).
" COLO. CONST. art. 6; Colorado Adopts Merit Selection Plan, 29 TEXAS B.J. 1012 (1966).
'2 ALASKA CONST. art. IV.
23 HAWAII CONST.; HAWAII REV. LAWS 9-26 (Supp. 1965).4 Potts, Unification of the Judiciary; A Record of Progress, 2 TEXAS L. REV. 445 (1924).
25 Dabney, Judicial Reconstruction, 6 TEXAS L. REV. 302 (1928).
26 13 TEX. CIV. JUD. COUNCIL ANN. REP. 10 (1941).
27 Stayton, A Prospect of Justice, 6 TEXAS B.J. 91 (1943).
'"McCormick, Modernizing the Texas Judicial System, 21 TEXAS L. REV. 673 (1943).
"Storey, Should Our Texas Constitution Be Revised?, 11 TEXAS B.J. 621 (1948).
'°Francis, Proposed Judiciary Article, 16 TEXAS B.J. 12 (1953).
31 Calvert, Problems of Judicial Administration, 25 TEXAS B.J. 639 (1962).




interchangeable duties with responsibility on an authoritative head, with
authority not merely of reversal for trial errors, but to supervise the work
of the entire system and see that it gets the job done.33
After much study the council drafted a proposed revision of article V
of the Texas Constitution and, in April 1946, submitted it to a joint
meeting of the State Bar Committee on Administration of Justice and the
Legislative Committee of the Judicial Section of the State Bar for sugges-
tions and criticism. In the light of these discussions, the proposal was re-
drafted' and was presented in the following year to the House Judiciary
Committee, which buried it in a subcommittee."3
The next major movement was instituted in 1952 by Cecil E. Burney,
who, as president of the state bar, appointed a special committee com-
posed of both lawyers and laymen to draft a new judicial article for sub-
mission to the legislature."6 Charles I. Francis of Houston was named chair-
man. This committee went to work promptly,37 drew up a proposed judici-
ary article embodying most of the features of the Judicial Council's plan,
and published it in the Texas Bar Journal." A referendum by state bar
members on this proposal resulted in 2,171 votes in favor and 1,465 votes
against." At the committee's suggestion, the 53rd Legislature, which was
already well advanced in its regular session, referred the matter to the
Texas Legislative Council for further study and report to the next legis-
lature.' Meanwhile, however, strong opposition to the proposal developed
in the state bar. It was the subject of a lengthy debate in the Resolutions
Committee at the 1954 annual meeting in San Antonio, and the conven-
tion assembly adopted a resolution to prohibit anyone from presenting any
proposed revision of article V to the legislature as a proposal of the state
bar until approved by a majority of the members by secret ballot. Accord-
ingly, the board of directors ordered another referendum and the De-
cember issue of the Bar Journal contained a revised version of the proposed
new article V, together with comments by Chairman Francis supporting
it and three articles opposing it."5 Among the features drawing the strong-
est objections were the broad power given the supreme court to create,
rearrange and abolish courts, the nominating commission method of se-
lecting judges, and the merger of the supreme court and court of criminal
appeals. The second referendum resulted in rejection of the proposal by a
vote of 3,800 to 1,960, killing any hope of a general reform sponsored
by the state bar.4
Since this decisive setback, no major effort toward broad-scale court re-
33 Note 26 supra.
34 18 TEX. CiV. JUD. COUNCIL ANN. REP. 13 (1946). This revision was presented to the bar
in 9 TEXAS B.J. 347 (1946); 10 TEXAS B.J. 179 (1947).
"n21 TEX. CIv. JUD. COUNCIL ANN. REP. 13 (1949).
36 15 TEXAS B.J. 107 (1952).
3' Id. at 197.
" 16 TEXAS B.J. 12 (1953).
39 Committee Reports: Constitutional Revision, 16 TEXAS B.J. 398 (1953).
4016 TEXAS B.J. 578 (1953); House Con. Res. No. 129, General & Special Laws of Texas,
53d Leg. 1160 (1953).
41 The articles are by R. R. Holloway of Brownwood, Carl Runge of San Angelo and William
E. Loose of Houston; 17 TEXAS B.J. 686 (1954).
4 18 TEXAS B.J. 65 (1955).
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organization has been undertaken in Texas. The most noteworthy expres-
sion on the subject has been made by the Texas Conference on Judicial
Selection, Tenure and Administration, composed of 300 judges, lawyers
and laymen, who convened in Austin in April 1964, under the sponsorship
of the state bar and the Joint Committee for the Effective Administration
of Justice. At this conference the lawyers and laymen, voting separately,
adopted "consensus statements," each of which declared, "Our present
number of unorganized and fragmented courts, operating without efficient
supervision and with little administrative control, is archaic and costly."'
The conference called for "a single and unified court system, with definite
supervisory and rule-making powers vested in the supreme court, to pro-
vide efficient and economical operation of the courts of Texas.""
From the foregoing it appears that although there has been a wide con-
sensus among reform-minded lawyers, judges, and even laymen on the
principles of unification, flexibility and administrative supervision within
the judiciary as goals of the judicial reform movement, efforts to obtain
legislative action on proposals for general court reorganization in Texas so
far have been uniformly unsuccessful. There has been no major alteration
in the Texas judicial structure since the courts of civil appeals were added
by the amendment of 1891. We still have essentially the same one-judge,
one-court organization at the trial level, with rigid jurisdictional lines and
with each judge largely independent of any supervisory control, except by
way of appellate review. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that there
has been no progress toward those goals, as a brief review of our judicial
history will show.
III. PAST STEPS TOWARD MODERN COURT ORGANIZATION
The pattern of one-judge, one-court structures arose in part out of
pioneer conditions in late 18th and early 19th century America, as Roscoe
Pound has explained. This was a departure from the pattern of the Eng-
lish common-law courts, which had several judges each and were cen-
tralized at Westminster. In England law judges traveled a circuit at cer-
tain seasons to conduct jury trials in the several counties nisi prius but
legal arguments were heard and judgments were rendered by the courts
sitting at Westminster. In America, west of the Alleghenies such centralized
courts of first instance would have involved great expense and considerable
inconvenience, and also would have been antithetical to emerging demo-
cratic criteria of selection and control. American courts were thought to
belong to the people-they were organized in an effort to bring the ad-
ministration of justice to each man's doorstep and to give each man a
measure of control over the judiciary. To this end there was a tendency to
divide each state geographically into circuits or districts, each with one
court and one local judge without any type of administrative supervision.
Judges were elected popularly and their tenure of office was for a term of
' Lawyers, Laymen, Urge Modernization of Texas' Antiquated Judicial System, 27 TEXAS




years. This pattern prevailed in twenty-three of the thirty-four states at
the beginning of the Civil War."
One difficulty with this system of independent localized trial courts is
that it presupposes districts of substantially equal population so that one
judge may suffice for each. With the population rapidly expanding, the
conditions so presupposed did not continue very long, and under the rigid
constitutional provisions it was thought necessary to add additional inde-
pendent single-judge courts rather than simply to add additional judges
to existing courts. "
The framers of the constitution of the Republic of Texas, following the
pattern familiar to them, provided in article IV, section 2: "The Republic
of Texas shall be divided into convenient judicial districts, not less than
three, nor more than eight. There shall be appointed for each district a
judge, who shall reside in the same, and hold the courts at such times and
places as Congress may by law direct."47 This provision was carried for-
ward into the first state constitution in 1845,48 and the same pattern was
incorporated into the constitution of 1876. 49
The disadvantage of this primitive judicial organization was soon felt.
The constitution of the Republic contained no provision for anyone to sit
in place of a judge who was disqualified or disabled."0 This defect was
provided for by the first step toward a unified judicial system; a consti-
tutional provision authorizing judges to "exchange districts or hold court
for each other when they deem it expedient."" This provision, which has
been carried forward into subsequent constitutions," has supplied the con-
stitutional basis for whatever flexibility exists today in assignment of
judges and causes."
With the growth of the population, it was inevitable that the one judge
per district formula would lead to difficulties. Not long after the present
'ROscoE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS, 89, 91, 122, 130, 158 (1940); see 3 COOLEY,
BLACKSTONE 352 (2d ed.). Popular selection of the judiciary for limited terms and localism
in state court structures, the two dominant characteristics of nineteenth century American state
systems, were the outgrowth of complex historical factors. Popular election was to a large extent
the result of expanding democratization in the pre-civil war period. HAYNES, THE SELECTION
AND TENURE OF JUDGES 80-101 (1944); HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 40 (1950).
Localism was similarly a popular movement, but its rationale was broader than simple principles of
democracy; an element of proximity to the people served was added. HURST, op. cit. supra at
92-97. During this short period of flux American innovators were experimenting with the codifica-
tion movement.
"POUND, Op. cit. supra note 45, at 130. Willard Hurst, after noting this by-product of
localism, found that:
[A] characteristic cluster of features grew about the central factor of the locality
as the unit of judicial organization: (1) a tendency to increase the number of courts
and judges in rather mechanical response to the pressure of business; (2) complica-
tions of venue, process, and varied local procedure; (3) almost complete autonomy
in each judge as to the efficiency, energy, and volume of work done in his court;
(4) the absence of any central authority empowered to shift judicial manpower from
underworked to overworked circuits.
HURST, Op. cit. supra note 45, at 94.
" SAYLES, CONSTITUTIONS OF TEXAS 161 (1888).4
1 Id. at 197.
4' TEx. CONST. art. V, S 7; SAYLES, Op. cit. supra note 47, at 539.
"°Wynne & Lawrence v. Underwood, 1 Tex. 48 (1846).
" TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 14 (1845); Sayles, op. cit. supra note 47, at 199.
" TEx. CONST. art. V, § 11 (1955).
sa Chadick, Texas-Style Court Administration, 26 TEXAS B.J. 375 (1963).
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constitution was adopted, additional judicial manpower was needed in
Bexar and Dallas Counties. The 21st Legislature sought to meet this need
by dividing each of these counties into two districts and running the divi-
sion line through the courthouses so that each judge could hold court in his
own district, though each was given concurrent jurisdiction throughout
the county." This arrangement was upheld by the supreme court in Lytle
v. Halff" and apparently it worked well enough until the Dallas County
courthouse burned down. Since no suitable building could be procured in
which each judge could sit within his own district, the commissioners'
court procured a building wholly within the 44th District. This expedient
was soon challenged. The supreme court held that although the legislature
evidently intended each court to be held in its own district, it also in-
tended both to sit in the same building, and since it was impossible under
the unforeseen circumstances to comply with both requirements, the latter
would prevail because of its greater importance to the public convenience.
In this connection Justice Henry observed: "There is no constitutional
restriction upon the power of the legislature to authorize both courts to
be held in the same district."5 Thus was the pattern set for the courts in
our present multi-district counties.
In these same statutes creating additional district courts in Bexar and
Dallas Counties the legislature took another step toward a unified judici-
ary. The judges were given power to transfer cases from one court to
another. 7 It is apparent that if there are two district courts with concur-
rent jurisdiction throughout the county, and cases may be freely trans-
ferred from one court to another, and if the judges are authorized to act
for each other, the system is similar to one court with two judges. This
tendency toward practical unity while maintaining theoretical distinction
between courts has been developed much further in the Special Practice
Act of 19235" and in the Administrative Judicial District Act of 1927. 59
The Special Practice Act went a long way toward practical unification
of the district courts in multi-district counties. Originally it applied only
to civil litigation in counties having two or more district courts with civil
jurisdiction only, but it was amended in 1939 to include civil litigation in
all counties with five or more district courts, civil or criminal." Most of
the provisions of the act were carried forward into rule 330 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure and made applicable to all district courts with
continuous terms." Since the terms of all district courts were made con-
tinuous in 1955," the act now applies to every district court.
54 Acts of 1889, ch. 128, at 152; ch. 140, at 165, 9 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1180, 1193
(1889).
55 75 Tex. 128, 12 S.W. 610 (1889).
5°Wheeler v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 489, 13 S.W. 305 (1890).
'
7 Acts of 1889, ch. 129, at 154; ch. 140, at 166, 9 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1181, 1194
(1889).
58TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2092 (1923).
"TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 200a (1959).60Acts of 1939, 46th Legislature, ch. 33, at 218; 31 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS ch. 33, at 218
(1939).
81 TEX. R. Civ. P. 330.
82 TEX. REV. CirV. STAT. ANN. art. 1919 (1964).
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The provisions of the act pertinent to unification are sections 21, 22, 24,
25 and 26 (now subdivisions (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of rule 330).
These provide that any judge may transfer cases from one court to an-
other and may try cases pending in any other court without formal trans-
fer, either in his own courtroom or in the court where the case is pending."3
A judge may hear any part of any case, or any preliminary matter, and
another judge may complete the hearing and render judgment." To pre-
vent a narrow construction, section 25 declares, perhaps too broadly, that,
"any judgment rendered or action taken by any judge in any of said courts
in the county shall be valid and binding."" The judges are directed to se-
lect one of their number as presiding judge, who may assign any case to
any judge and may assign any judge to try any case."" When any judge
becomes disengaged, he is directed to notify the presiding judge, who must
transfer to him the next case ready for trial in any of the courts." '
The constitutionality of the act has been upheld" and its provisions have
been applied liberally in a variety of circumstances to sustain acts of
judges in cases not actually pending in their courts. 6 The only limitation
has been the practical consideration that a judge cannot act in a case which
is actually in process of trial before another judge."'
Proponents of a unified court system cite as one of its principal advan-
tages the flexibility it offers in permitting judicial manpower to be
shifted from one county to another as the volume of litigation requires.
The same legislature that passed the Special Practice Act sought to deal
with this problem also. It passed House Bill No. 537, which attempted
to impose on the chief justice, or on any associate justice of the supreme
court named by him, the duty to designate a district judge to call a special
term in another district. This could be done "when required in the public
6
aTEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2092, § 21 (1964).
4TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2092, §§ 24, 25 (1964).65 TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2092, 25 (1964).
6 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2092, § 26 (1964).
67 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2092, § 22 (1964). Judge Smedley, as a member of the
Commission of Appeals, recognized that the sweeping terms of this statute "apparently make the
judge of each district court in effect or to an extent the judge of any other district court in the
county." And the Dallas court of civil appeals has gone so far as to say that in effect it "oblit-
erates all distinctions between the civil district courts of Dallas County and constitutes each a
part of a greater judicial organism." See also, DeZavala v. Scanlan, 65 S.W.2d 489, 494 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1933); DeWitt v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 168 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
"SCurrie v. Dobbs, 10 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).6 9 DeBusk v. Cadenhead, 346 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (judge who presided at trial
may have another judge hear testimony on motion for new trial and have such testimony re-
corded for first judge to read in passing on motion); Bickman v. Herrin Transp. Co., 344 S.W.2d
953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (judges could be changed in course of jury trial and judge who sat
at first part of trial could pass on motion for new trial); Rawlins v. Stahl, 329 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1959) (after temporary injunction was granted, another court could hear merits and
dissolve injunction); Mullins v. Mullins, 300 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) (though only
court which granted divorce may modify child support order, it was presumed that judge who
signed modification order was sitting for judge of that court) ; Harkness v. McQueen, 207 S.W.2d
676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (new trial could be granted in different court from that which
rendered original judgment); Angelo v. Holland Tex. Hypotheek Bank, 52 S.W.2d 785 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932) (judge could consolidate and try separate suits pending in different courts without
having one transferred). Similar results have been reached under a local statute authorizing dis-
trict judges in Harris County to act for each other. Boyles v. Cohen, 230 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.; Porch v. Rooney, 275 S.W. 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925) error ref.
'ODeZavala v. Scanlan, 65 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933); Harkness v. McQueen,
207 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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interest by reason either of the urgency of business, or the accumulation
thereof." In the same manner, the Supreme Court was also authorized to
designate a district judge to discharge the duties of the regular judge of
another district along with the regular judge, with both judges sitting in
the same court at the same time. In order to facilitate this procedure, dis-
trict clerks were required to make an annual report to the clerk of the
supreme court concerning the number of cases on their dockets." This was
too much for the supreme court justices of that day, who felt that they
were already overburdened, and held the bill unconstitutional as an at-
tempt to confer upon them non-judicial duties." It is interesting to note
that Justice Greenwood, who wrote the opinion for the court, was not at
that time chairman of the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform
of the Texas Bar Association. At its meeting that year the association
adopted his report recommending "that the State be redistricted into not
over nine judicial districts, with enough judges in each district to attend
to the business therein, with power lodged in the presiding judge to send
any district judge anywhere in the district, to the end that business may
be disposed of promptly."" This proposal seems to have been a forerunner
of the Administrative Judicial District Act, generally known as article
200a, which was enacted by the 40th Legislature. 4 This act divides the
state into nine administrative judicial districts, each with a presiding
judge appointed by the governor. The presiding administrative judge is
the key administrative officer in the Texas judicial system. He is em-
powered to assign judges to hold court in other districts when the regular
judge is absent, disabled or disqualified, and also when the regular judge is
present and trying cases.' He has the duty to call a conference of all
judges in the administrative district at least once a year for consultation
concerning disposition of both civil and criminal business, and such con-
ference is empowered to adopt rules concerning the order of trials and such
other rules and regulations as may be 'necessary." By the amendment of
1957, it is made the duty of the judges to serve in the courts to which they
are assigned, but no penalty is provided for refusal. The amendment of
1961 provides incentive pay of twenty-five dollars per day in addition to
his expenses, 8 and another amendment in 1965 adds the differential, if any,
between the pay of the visiting judge and that of the regular judge of the
court to which he is assigned." The 1961 amendment also directs the chief
justice of the supreme court to call meetings of the presiding judges to
study the conditions of the dockets of the various courts to determine the
need for assignment of judges and to promote effective administration.
The chief justice is authorized by the amendment to assign judges for
?'Acts of 1923, ch. 146, at 315, 21 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS ch. 146, at 315 (1923).
7 In re House Bill No. 537, 113 Tex. 367, 256 S.W. 573 (1923); see comments of Potts,
Unification of the Judiciary: A Record of Progress, 2 TEXAS L. REV. 445, 455-57 (1924).
"aBaker, The Bar Association's Legislative Program, 2 TEXAS L. REV. 422 (1924).74 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 200a (1927).75 TEX. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, §§ 2, 5 (1927).7 8 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 4 (1927).7 7 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 5a (1957).
7 TEX. REV. CI. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 2a(4) (1961).79 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 10a (1965).
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service outside their own administrative judicial districts." Although this
authority is limited, it can be viewed as the first step in vesting in the
chief justice ultimate administrative responsibility for a unified judicial
system. It appears that the present supreme court will adopt an attitude
somewhat different from that of the court which rejected House Bill No.
537.8 Chief Justice Calvert has accepted his administrative responsibilities
under article 200a, has called meetings of the presiding judges, and has be-
gun to provide the leadership expected of his office.
The validity of article 200a has been upheld by courts of civil appeals.82
Since its enactment, extensive use has been made of visiting judges, prin-
cipally as replacements for judges who have been disabled, disqualified, or
on vacation, although they have also been used to some extent in metro-
politan counties in addition to regular judges to relieve docket congestion.8
However, this use has been hampered by shortage of court facilities and
staff for visiting judges in the larger counties. Also, there has been some
resistance to the use of visiting judges on the part of the bar, partly be-
cause of the inaccessibility of the judge after the trial is completed, and
partly because of the "human element," in that lawyers prefer to present
their cases before judges they know. 4 The financial inducements in the act
seem to be effective, since it appears that assignments are rarely refused.8
Article 200a has also facilitated another step toward a unified judiciary.
In 1941 Chief Justice Alexander called the first statewide conference of
trial and appellate judges in Texas. 8 Similar meetings have since been
sponsored by the Judicial Section of the State Bar of Texas. Although the
section is a voluntary organization, and attendance is not compulsory,
meetings are well attended, particularly by district judges.' These meetings
give the judges an opportunity to work together on common problems of
administration, as well as to study matters helpful to them in their duties
on the bench.
No account of progress toward a unified judiciary could properly omit
the important work of the Texas Civil Judicial Council, which was crea-
ted by the 53rd Legislature." Besides its activities in studying and rec-
ommending changes in statutory and constitutional provisions concerning
organization and operation of the courts, the council is the only agency
"2TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 2a (1961).
8' Supra note 72.
"Haley v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 392, 208 S.W.2d 378 (1948); Eucaline v. Standard Inv.
Co., 25 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Currie v. Dobbs, 10 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928).
" Chadick, Texas-Style Court Administration, 26 TEXAs B.J. 375 (1963) ; Rogers, Trial Court
Administration, 25 TEXAS B.J. 185 (1962); Smith, Court Administration in Texas: Business With-
out Management, 44 TEXAs L. REV. 1142, 1152-57 (1966).
"Rogers, supra note 83, at 235.
'Calvert, Problems of Judicial Administration, 25 TEXAS B.J. 639, 640 (1962); Chadick,
Obscurity Can Be an Asset, 25 TEXAS B.J. 189, 190 (1962); Smith, sura note 83, at 1153.
88 Alexander, The Improvement of Our Judicial System, 28 A.B.A.J. 326 (1942).
87The expenses of district judges are paid under section 8 of article 200a, since the nine pre-
siding administrative judges customarily call conferences of the judges from their respective ad-
ministrative districts at the same time and place. No similar provision is made for the expenses of
appellate and county court judges.
"Tx. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328a (1929).
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empowered to gather judicial statistics." In 1961 the House of Represen-
tatives, confronted with demands for creation of new courts, directed the
council to gather detailed information on the condition of the dockets of
the district courts, and an appropriation was made for the employment of
a full-time statistician." Various problems have been encountered in ob-
taining reliable and accurate statistics, as well as in making use of them
after they are tabulated, but substantial progress is being made toward de-
veloping the statistical information essential to any effective supervision
of a unified judicial system."'
All of the developments mentioned so far have been made without the
necessity of constitutional amendment. Article V has been amended sev-
eral times but no major structural change has been made since the amend-
ment of 1891. The following amendments may be considered steps in the
process toward a unified judiciary: abolition of the commission of appeals
and its absorption into the supreme court thereby increasing it to nine
members (1945)," discipline and removal of judges (1965) ,o9 and increase
of the court of criminal appeals to five members (1966) by absorption
of its two commissioners."4
IV. POSSIBLE STEPS TOWARD A UNIFIED JUDICIARY
The foregoing discussion of some of the developments in the field of
judicial administration in Texas during the past fifty years may give some
indication of how Texas courts, without any major structural change,
have been enabled to meet the tremendous increase in judicial business
during that period. Other developments have contributed to that process,
particularly the adoption of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in 1941.
Texas does not yet have a unified judiciary, but the specific legislative
enactments and constitutional amendments which have been noted do
point unmistakably in that direction. The remaining portion of this ar-
ticle will be concerned with further steps toward that goal. Since proposals
for general court reform have not found favor in the past, consideration
will be given to various possible concrete measures related to present ju-
dicial structures, mainly by amendments to existing statutes and rules of
procedure, with only a minimum of tinkering with the basic provisions of
article V.
A. Multi-District Counties
Local Rules Section 27 of article 2092 provided that a majority of the
judges of the district courts could make rules for calling the docket, for
setting and postponement of cases, for classifying and distributing cases,
"TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328a, § 5(4) (1929).
"Rogers, Trial Court Administration, 25 TEXAS B.J. 185, 234 (1962); House Simple Resolu-
tion 62, TEX. H.R.J. 424, 687 (1961).
" Chadick, Obscurity Can Be an Asset, 25 TEXAS B.J. 189 (1962); Smith, Judicial Statistics
in Texas, 25 TEXAS B.J. 193 (1962); and see further comments by Smith on inadequacy of sta-
tistics in Smith, Court Administration in Texas, Business Without Management, 44 TEXAS L. REV.
1142, 1158-65 (1966).
" TEx. CONST. art. V, § 2.
'aTEX. CONST. art. V, § la.
941 TEX. CONST. ANN. 6, 7 (Supp. 1966).
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for having one calendar for all cases set in all courts, and could make
such other rules as they deemed advisable to facilitate the dispatch of
business.95 When the Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1941, sec-
tion 27 was among the provisions of the statutes that were listed as re-
pealed.' No comparable provision was brought forward into the new
rules. Rule 817 merely authorizes each district and county court to make
rules not inconsistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure."' The result is that
local rules of practice cannot be uniformly effective in all the district
courts of a county without unanimous action and consent of all the dis-
trict judges. The same situation prevails in the county courts at law. No
reason has been discovered for this curious step backward in the direction
of separate, uncoordinated courts. It may be noted that article 200a au-
thorizes the council of judges in each administrative district to adopt rules
concerning the order of trials and other rules necessary to the purposes
of the act, 8 and one of the purposes for which the chief justice is author-
ized to call a meeting of the presiding judges is to compare local court
rules for achieving uniformity so far as practicably consistent with local
conditions."'
Suggestion: Amend rule 817 to restore the power of a majority of the
district judges exercising civil jurisdiction in a county to adopt local rules
of practice effective in all district courts, and extend this authority to the
judges of the county courts at law. It has been noted that rule 330(i),
which was carried forward from section 26 of article 2092, authorizes
the district judges of courts having civil jurisdiction to select by majority
vote a presiding judge with authority to assign a case in any court to
another judge, and to assign any judge to try a case.0 ° In a unified court
system the usual pattern is for the local presiding judge to have wide ad-
ministrative authority concerning the settling of cases, the assignment of
judges to specialized divisions of the court, and the handling of other ju-
dicial business. Under present circumstances, there may be little need to
increase the authority of the local presiding judge. In Harris and Bexar
Counties, civil cases are handled under a master calendar system by local
rules which empower the presiding judge to assign cases to individual
courts.' ° In Dallas and Tarrant Counties, the civil district courts operate
under an individual assignment system which makes each individual judge
responsible for the cases on his docket.' 2 Under this system the local pre-
siding judge has little administrative authority beyond presiding at meet-
ings. Both systems have advantages and seem to be well accepted by the
bar in their respective counties.
9 0 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2092, § 27 (1964).
"TEX. R. Civ. P., list of repealed statutes following rule 822; and see editor's note following
TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2092 (1964).
9
TEx. R. Civ. P. 817.
9 9 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 4 (1959).
9 TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 2(a) (1959).
'°TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2092, § 26 (1964).
"'o HARRIS COUNTY DIST. CT. R. 6-8; BEXAR COUNTY DIST. CT. SPECIAL R. § 11(f).
102 DALLAS COUNTY DIST. CT. CIv. R. 1; TARRANT COUNTY DIST. & DOM. REL. CT. SPECIAL
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However, in the future, as the number of judges increases and the pres-
sure of litigation mounts, it is likely that confusion and inefficiency will
result unless effective and uniform administrative supervision is provided.
Automated data processing is already in use in several metropolitan trial
courts,0 3 and it is not difficult to foresee an increased use of such methods
for such purposes as determining the proper load and balance of litigation
on weekly trial lists, minimizing conflicting engagements of counsel, print-
ing and mailing out notices of settings, gathering and tabulating of statis-
tics and the like. Such methods can be employed to reduce loss of time
from postponements and uncertainties in bringing cases to trial, and can
free the trial judges from administrative tasks so that they may use their
time more productively in the actual disposition of litigation. Effective
use of such methods, however, requires that overall responsibility for ad-
ministration be fixed in a presiding judge, with adequate supervisory au-
thority. Local rules enacted under rule 817, if that rule is amended as
above suggested, may be sufficient as a source of such authority. How-
ever, a more general grant of such authority may ultimately be desirable.
Suggestion: Amend rule 330 to give the local presiding judge full con-
trol over assignment of cases and judges, and scheduling of preliminary
proceedings, trials and the like, subject to the provisions of any local rules
concerning such matters.
Selection of Local Presiding Judge Under rule 330(i) a majority of
the civil district judges' elect a local presiding judge. Several local sta-
tutes authorize election of presiding judges by all district judges, civil and
criminal.' There are advantages in the election of a local presiding judge
by his colleagues. For instance, the effectiveness with which he discharges
his administrative duties depends very largely upon their voluntary coop-
eration and confidence in him. They know his qualifications, and by elect-
ing him they commit themselves to some measure of support. However,
there are also disadvantages. For example, when elected officials choose their
own presiding officer, they will almost inevitably rotate the office among
themselves without regard to qualification. There is a strong feeling that
since each has the same rank, each is entitled to the same recognition, and
also that each should take his turn with the administrative chores. Thus,
in Harris and Bexar Counties, where the presiding judge has charge of the
master calendar and assigns all contested cases out for trial, the practice is
to change presiding judges every month or two. Under these circum-
stances, continuity of administration is difficult to maintain.
The fact is that judges differ very considerably in their administrative
capabilities. A judge may be a profound legal scholar and may be an ideal
trial judge in a jury case, but he may have neither the temperament nor
the inclination for administration. It is a waste of the talents of such a
judge to occupy his time and energy with administrative matters. Also,
103 Adams, How To Approach Computers, NAT'L ASS'N OF TRIAL COURT ADM'RS PROCEEDINGS
OF ANN. CONFERENCE 3 (1966); Ellenbogen, Automation in the Courts, So A.B.A.J. 655 (1964).
"°TEx. R. Civ. P. 330(i).
'TEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. art. 199(11) (Supp. 1966) (Harris County), art. 199(14)
(Supp. 1966) (Dallas County), art. 199(37), § (H) (Supp. 1966) (Bexar County).
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administration requires a certain firmness, and this is difficult to maintain
where the presiding judge knows that another judge, whom he may have
to deal with, may be trading places with him next month or next year.
The test is whether the advantages of administrative supervision out-
weigh the disadvantages. There is much to be said for a system which
gives each individual judge undivided responsibility for handling cases on
his docket from beginning to end. Each judge then has a strong stimulus
to attend to his business and adopt efficient methods of operation, since
under this system the bar and the public can easily determine which judges
are keeping up with their dockets. Where each judge is administratively as
well as judicially independent, the local presiding judge need have little
power, and it makes little difference who holds the office. Without an in-
crease in the authority of the presiding judge along the lines already dis-
cussed it may be preferable for his colleagues to elect him. However, in
the future, if the pressure of business in metropolitan trial courts should
create a strong demand for reform in the direction of a unified judiciary,
the local presiding judge may have to be selected by and made respon-
sible to a higher judicial officer, who has direct responsibility for efficient
operation of the trial courts. The logical person would be the presiding
judge of the administrative judicial district.
Suggestion: Amend rule 330(i), and perhaps also article 200a, to au-
thorize the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district to ap-
point the local presiding judge.
Assignment of Criminal Cases The power of the local presiding judge to
assign cases under rule 330(i) applies to civil litigation only. Whether
similar authority should exist in criminal cases is a question which deserves
serious consideration. Criminal district courts operate under particular sta-
tutes which typically permit transfer of cases between courts and author-
ize judges to exchange benches and sit for other judges in their absence,
but provide no power of assignment or other administrative supervision."'
Such authority could be granted by amending these particular statutes or
by amending the Code of Criminal Procedure or article 200a. The most
obvious need is for a responsible judicial officer to have authority to assign
the best available judicial talent to criminal cases of great importance. In
England, the Lord Chief Justice presides over important trials.""7 The pre-
siding judge of the administrative judicial district is probably the proper
person to exercise this authority since he is in a good position to select a
judge for that purpose and to bring in a judge from another county, if
needed.
Suggestion: Amend article 200a to authorize the presiding administra-
tive judge to assign criminal cases for trial to any judge selected by him.
"' TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1926-26 (Supp. 1966) (Dallas County), art. 1926-33,
3 (Supp. 1966) (Harris County), art. 1926-43, §§ 3, 5 (Supp. 1966) (Tarrant County), art.
199(37), § 1 (Supp. 1966) (Bexar County). See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1916
(1959).
.7 Pound, Remarks to Texas Bar Association, 37 TEX. BAR Ass'N PROc. 215 (1918). See God-
dard, Organization and Jurisdiction of the Courts of England, 44 J. AM. Juo. Soc'y 60 (1960).
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B. District Administrative Reforms
Selection of Administrative Judge The presiding judge of each of the
nine administrative judicial districts is now appointed by the governor
from among the elected district judges.' In the past, governors have gen-
erally made these appointments on merit, without regard to political con-
siderations, and have reappointed administrative judges upon expiration
of their terms. However, continuation of the movement toward a unified
judicial system would require application of the principle of administra-
tive supervision within the judiciary. If the powers of the administrative
judges are to be increased along the lines discussed in this article, it may
become somewhat more important than it is now to eliminate the possi-
bility of influence by the executive. In a unified judiciary, the chief justice
of the supreme court, as administrative head of the system, would have
power to appoint regional administrators who would then be responsible
to him.'0
It may be observed that assignments under article 200a are now almost
altogether voluntary. The presiding judge looks upon his functions as pri-
marily that of providing assistance to the individual trial judge who is
disabled or disqualified in a particular case, or has a particular docket
problem, such as that created by a protracted trial. Upon a request for
assistance, the presiding judge contacts judges in his own administrative
district or in some other district until he finds one free to accept the as-
signment."' If a particular judge does not want to go, he can usually find
business to occupy him in his own district. Consequently, there is no oc-
casion for the presiding judge to make an assignment over objection of
either the judge assigned or of the judge of the court to which he is as-
signed. This arrangement has been helpful in relieving docket problems,
but it is not administrative supervision of the type employed in a really
unified system,' and it probably falls short of the objectives contemplated
in article 200a."' To achieve effective administration it would be neces-
sary to impose on the presiding judge greater responsibility for actual op-
eration of the courts within his administrative district. This result may be
accomplished by giving the local presiding judges more authority and by
making them responsible to the presiding administrative judge, as pre-
viously suggested. If he, in turn, were made responsible to the chief jus-
tice, a workable administrative structure would be established.
Suggestion: Amend article 200a by giving the chief justice of the su-
preme court authority to appoint the presiding judges of the nine admin-
istrative judicial districts.
10TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, § 2 (1959).
10' POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTs 284 (1940); Report of the Special Committee To Sug-
gest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws To Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation,
34 A.B.A. REP. 590 (1909).
11o Usually this is not difficult, since judges enjoy a change of scene, particularly when the
change is to a larger city, and the attraction is further enhanced by the financial inducements
afforded by article 200a. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 200a, §§ 2a(d) (1961), 10a (1965).
... Smith, Court Administration in Texas: Business Without Management, 44 TEXAs L. REV.
1142, 1152-57 (1966).
11 32 TEX. CiV. JUD. COUNCIL ANN. RE1. 21 (1960); Better Use of Judges, Address by
G. W. Parker, Jr. to Judicial Section of State Bar of Texas, September 1966.
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Redistricting Board Under the constitution of 1876 it is the responsibil-
ity of the legislature to establish judicial districts, and, consequently, the
number of district courts. Section 7 of article V provides: "The State shall
be divided into as many judicial districts as may now or hereafter be pro-
vided by law, which may be increased or diminished by law." Proper
exercise of this responsibility has been very difficult. With the shift of pop-
ulation from rural areas to the cities, metropolitan courts have been over-
loaded and rural courts have frequently operated on a part-time basis.
Temporary assignment of judges from rural districts under article 200a is
a make-shift arrangement at best. Yet no general redistricting measure
has been adopted by the legislature since 1933,13 notwithstanding repeated
efforts by the state bar and the Judicial Council.11" Rural legislators, who
have exerted a controlling influence in past sessions, have been reluctant
to share their local district courts or abolish the jobs of local district judges,
and have not been deeply concerned with docket congestion in the cities.
Yet there has been strong resistance in the legislature to creation of needed
new courts without a general redistricting measure. Governor Connally
declared his views to this effect quite emphatically in addressing the Ju-
dicial Section Meeting in Brownsville in September 1963. In that same
year the House of Representatives, by House Simple Resolution No. 348,
directed the Texas Civil Judicial Council to make a comprehensive study
of the adequacy of the present system of district courts and of the need
to redistrict the state for judicial purposes. Pursuant to this direction, the
council drafted a constitutional amendment and a statute to create a ju-
dicial redistricting board composed of the chief justices of the supreme
court and of the courts of civil appeals, and the president of the council,
with authority to make orders rearranging judicial districts, subject to leg-
islative veto. The proposed amendment would retain in the legislature the
power to enact a general judicial reapportionment. One feature of the pro-
posal is the power of the board to abolish or rearrange districts on occur-
rence of a vacancy in the office of district judge.11 This proposal was a part
of the state bar's legislative program in 1965," and again in 1967 judicial
redistricting is on the agenda, this time with the support of a resolution by
the judges themselves at their annual meeting, though the exact form of the
proposal was not announced at the beginning of the session." ' If the mea-
sure adopted is solely a statutory rearrangement of existing districts, the
effect will be temporary, and no lasting solution will be provided.
Since judicial apportionment has caused such difficulty for the legisla-
ture, a logical solution would be some type of redistricting board along
"
3 Acts of 1883, ch. 67, at 56, 9 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 362 (1883). A redistricting
measure is now pending in the legislature at the time this Article goes to press.
114 Judicial Redistricting, 16 TEXAS B.J. 65, 389 (1953); McSwain, Proposed New System for
District Court Apportionment, 27 TEXAS B.J. 951 (1964).
'16McSwain, supra note 114; Proposed Constitutional Amendment Creating the Judicial Dis-
tricting Board, 27 TEXAS B.J. 953 (1964); Recommended Statute Regarding Judicial Districts
Board, 27 TEXAS B.J. 954 (1964).
11Directors Adopt Legislative Program, 27 TEXAS B.J. 856 (1964).
117 Barker, Bar's Legislative Program, 29 TEXAS B.J. 999 (1966); Stovall, Judicial Redistricting,
29 TEXAS B.J. 1011 (1966). See note 113 supra.
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the lines proposed by the Judicial Council, with power to give continuous
attention to the problem and to minimize the impact on individual judges
by rearranging districts when judicial vacancies occur. Probably, however,
the presiding judges of the administrative districts would be more fa-
miliar with the problems and personalities involved and would be in a
better position to function on the board than the chief justices of the
courts of civil appeals. Moreover, the administrative judges, together with
the chief justice of the supreme court, already constitute a functioning
body under article 200a"' and judicial reapportionment would be directly
related to the duties which they already perform.
Suggestion: Amend section 7 of article V by creating a judicial district
board composed of the chief justice of the supreme court and the presiding
judges of the nine administrative judicial districts, with continuing power,
subject to legislative veto, to rearrange judicial districts in the manner pro-
posed by the Judicial Council, and to increase the number of judges as
needed.
Multi-Judge Courts Although Texas courts have come a long way under
articles 2092 and 200a from the separate uncoordinated courts of frontier
days, now and then the "one judge, one court" structure still leads to
procedural complications. A recent example is the case of Johnson v.
Avery."' In that case A sued J in a district court and shortly afterward
J brought a suit against A in another district court in the same county
concerning the same subject matter. A sought to abate the second suit be-
cause of the pendency of the first, but the second district court overruled
his plea on the ground that A had fraudulently induced J to delay filing his
suit. A then sought a temporary injunction in the first court to restrain J
from prosecuting the second suit, and this injunction was granted after a
hearing lasting nine days. The court of civil appeals affirmed, but the
supreme court reversed the temporary injunction on the ground that the
second court had the right to determine whether A was estopped by his
fraud to assert the prior active jurisdiction of the first court. Obviously,
this controversy would have been much less complicated if there had been
only one district court with several judges. Assignment of a judge to hear
the case would then be purely an administrative matter. Actually, no rea-
son is apparent why this particular problem could not have been handled
administratively by transfer and consolidation or joint hearing under rules
330 (i) and 174 (a)."' In the event of a disagreement between two judges,
the local presiding judge has power to resolve the matter by an assign-
ment under rule 330(i). However, the fact that a hearing was held for
nine days on the question of which of two district judges should hear a
case on the merits, with an appeal on this question going all the way to
the supreme court, demonstrates the difficulties which can still arise from
the existence of separate and distinct district courts in the same county.
Another example is Lord v. Clayton,"' where the judge of a district
nSSee text accompanying notes 74, 80, 98, 99, 110 supra.
"' 10 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1191 (1966), reversing Johnson v. Avery, 400 S.W.2d 825 (1966).
"'2Tx. R. CIv. P. 330(i), 174(a).
121 163 Tex. 62, 352 S.W.2d 718 (1961).
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court which ordinarily tried only civil cases empaneled a grand jury, re-
ceived an indictment, issued a capias for arrest of the accused; and after
the district clerk transferred the case to the criminal district court as di-
rected by statute, the judge of the first court sought to restrain the judge
of the criminal district court from proceeding with a habeas corpus hear-
ing, as well as to restrain the accused from prosecution of the habeas cor-
pus. The supreme court held that although the first judge had authority
to empanel the grand jury and had jurisdiction to try the case, he could
not interfere with the habeas corpus proceeding in the other court. 2 '
Federal district courts have more than one judge,2 ' but in Texas section
7 of article V, which survives from the constitution of the Republic,
states: "For each district there shall be elected ... a judge . ,,.,."' A con-
stitutional amendment would be necessary to authorize more than one
judge to sit permanently in the same court, but it would be comparatively
simple to draft such an amendment.
Another residual limitation of the one judge, one court concept is the
lack of authority for more than one judge to sit together in the same case
in the trial court. In important and difficult cases there are advantages in
the common law practice of trial judges sitting en banc for certain mat-
ters, as there are in the modern federal practice of convening a special
three-judge district court for certain cases."' If Texas district courts could
have more than one judge, they could sit in panels or en banc, as they
might determine from administrative considerations. The legislature or a
judicial districts board would have authority to consolidate the trial courts
in multi-judge counties into a single administrative unit, with a presiding
judge who would have authority to resolve any conflicts between judges
as a matter of administration.
Suggestion: Amend section 7 of article V to authorize more than one
judge to be elected for each district, as provided by law. Include this pro-
vision, if possible, in any amendment establishing a judicial districts board.
C. Appellate Courts
Assignment of Judges to Appellate and Trial Courts One feature of a
unified judiciary is that all judges are judges of but one court, which has
specialized branches, both trial and appellate, to which judges are assigned
administratively."' The Texas Bar Association's reform plan of 1918 went
.. In this connection, see also Carlson v. Johnson, 327 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
There a divorce decree with provisions for custody, visitation and child support was granted by
one of the district courts of Harris County. Later a motion for contempt was filed in the same
court to enforce the decree. The district judge signed an order transferring the case to one of the
two domestic relations courts which had been created since the original decree. The court of
civil appeals held that the transfer was improper because one court could not punish a party for
contempt of another court, citing Ex parle Gonzales, 111 Tex. 399, 238 S.W. 635 (1922), a case
arising before enactment of article 2092. Apparently the statute creating the domestic relations
court did not authorize it to sit for the district court in such matters, though the district court
was authorized to transfer to the domestic relations court matters within the latter's jurisdiction.
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-11 (1959). Quaere: Can one district judge sitting for an-
other under rule 330(e) impose punishment for contempt of the latter's court?
1"328 U.S.C. § 132 (1964).
"A TEx. CONsT. art. V, § 7.
'28 U.S.C. § 2281, 2282, 2284 (1964).
126 POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTs 278 (1940).
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so far as to require supreme court justices to sit for one month each year
in the district courts, and provided that the chief justice should have the
power to designate district judges to sit as needed on the supreme court.""
In the federal courts, circuit judges may be assigned to the district court,
and district judges may be assigned to the courts of appeals.'28 The same
practice is employed occasionally in New Mexico. "
Of course, the system functions more smoothly and with less waste of
manpower when judges have permanent assignments, but occasion may
arise where it would be advantageous to assign a trial judge temporarily
to sit for a disabled or disqualified appellate judge. Also, where a trial
judge of ability and reputation has been elevated to an appellate court, it
may be sound administration to assign him to try an important case in
the district court. Possibly the administration of justice would be promoted
by occasional exchanges that would permit the trial judge to view a record
through the eyes of an appellate judge, and would remind the appellate
judge of the realities of the trial court. Here, again, constitutional difficul-
ties arise, but a fairly simple amendment should suffice.
Suggestion: Amend article V so as to empower the chief justice to assign
any appellate justice or district judge to sit in any court, trial or appellate.
Size of Court of Civil Appeals In 1891 in order to relieve the congested
docket of the supreme court, the people of Texas adopted a constitutional
amendment providing:
The Legislature shall as soon as practicable after the adoption of this
amendment divide the State into not less than two nor more than three
Supreme Judicial Districts and thereafter into such additional districts as
the increase of population and business may require, and shall establish a
Court of Civil Appeals in each of said districts, which shall consist of a
Chief Justice and two Associate Justices . *. . .0
Though the increase in population and judicial business was definitely
foreseen, the only remedy granted to deal with it was to create additional
districts with a court of civil appeals in each. This process has gone on
until there are now thirteen courts of civil appeals.' The thirty-nine jus-
tices, together with the nine justices of the supreme court and the five
judges of the court of criminal appeals amount to fifty-three appellate
judges, by far the highest number for any state. According to the list of
appellate judges in West Publishing Company's National Reporter Sys-
tem, New York has thirty-three,"' California has forty,3 " and Illinois has
fourteen." 4
The justices of the courts of civil appeals may not exchange benches or
sit for each other. The only element of flexibility is article 1738, which
12'37 TEx. BAR ASS'N PROCEEDINGS 151 (1918).
12828 U.S.C. §§ 191-92 (1964).
" Carmody, Trial Cases by Appellate Judges, 5 TRIAL JUDGES J., No. 4, p. 1 (1966).
130 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6.
'I'TEx. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 198 (Supp. 1966).
'a-'272 N.Y.S.2d vii (1966).
3 52 Cal. Rep. v (1966), not including appellate divisions of the superior courts, which hear
appeals from justices and other inferior courts.
134219 N.E.2d v (1966).
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authorizes the supreme court to equalize the dockets of the courts of civil
appeals by transferring cases from one court to another and permits the
justices to hear transferred cases in the courtrooms of the courts from
which they were transferred."
Notwithstanding the increase in the number of appellate courts, their
districts are so unequally apportioned that in 1965 the number of appeals
filed by districts varied from 38 to 229 and extensive use was made of
the supreme court's power to equalize the dockets. In that year the Hous-
ton court decided 115 cases and had 108 transferred to other courts, and
the Dallas court decided 105 cases and had 110 transferred.'" This con-
tinuing imbalance has raised the demand for a second court of civil ap-
peals in Houston and Dallas. Since section 6 of article V says that each
court "shall consist of a Chief Justice and two Associate Justices," a con-
stitutional amendment would be required to add additional justices to
existing courts.
The federal courts of appeals have as many circuit judges as Congress
finds necessary, and although they are authorized to sit in panels of three,"37
as they normally do, they may sit en banc."'3 There would be an advantage
in similar flexibility for the courts of civil appeals. A single court with six
members can probably operate more efficiently than two separate courts
with three members each. For instance, the same clerk, courtroom, library,
and consultation room could serve a larger court. Moreover, if there are to
be more than three justices in one district, there is no necessity for the
number to be a multiple of three.
Authorizing more than three justices per district would also facilitate
consolidation of some of the present unloaded districts without forcing
any of the incumbents out of office. The legislature could then provide
for reduction of the number of justices as vacancies occur. Then, the su-
preme judicial districts could be rearranged along more functional lines,
and it might eventually be possible to reduce the total number of justices,
or, at least, to avoid further increases, as well as to minimize the need for
the transfer of cases. Although the equalization practice has been effec-
tive to prevent docket congestion, lawyers have a strong preference for
presenting cases to their own local court of appeals.
Suggestion: Amend section 6 of article V to provide that each court of
civil appeals "shall consist of a Chief Justice and two or more Associate
Justices."
D. Special Courts
Family District Courts It is a mark of a primitive judicial system to cre-
ate a specialized court to handle each new problem. 3' The distinguishing
feature of advanced court organization is a flexible judiciary capable of
adapting to new conditions with assignment of judges to specialized divi-
" TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1738 (1962).
13. 37 TEx. Clv. JuD. COUNCIL ANN. REP. 47 (1965).
13728 U.S.C. §§ 46(b), (c) (1965).
3
'Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
139 POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 5 (1940).
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sions when specialization is advantageous, but available for reassignment
to other divisions when needed."0 The creation of specialized courts of do-
mestic relations in Texas is a reversion to primitive organization. At least
nineteen of these courts now exist in various Texas counties, all created
within the past twenty years.141 The principal reason for this has been the
failure of the legislature to make a proper judicial apportionment so as to
provide additional district courts as needed in the larger counties. In order
to relieve intolerable pressures on regular district courts, which are fi-
nanced in part by the state, the legislature has established these specialized
courts under its authority to establish "other courts" not conforming to
the constitutional pattern." The gimmick is that these courts are financed
entirely from county funds; thus the legislation is essentially local in na-
ture and no opposition is encountered from legislators from other dis-
tricts.
A justification for these courts is that they permit more continuity in
handling of domestic relations matters than was possible when domestic
relations work was rotated among the district judges on a short-term basis.
The classic weakness of specialized courts with limited jurisdiction is
that there are numerous cases where these courts cannot give complete
relief because title to real estate or the interests of third persons are in-
volved." Consequently, the Family Law Section of the State Bar has pro-
posed converting all these courts into "family district courts," which would
simply be constitutional district courts operating under a statute requir-
ing them to give preference to domestic relations and juvenile matters'"
Juvenile and domestic relations courts do not need to be separate in order
to secure the services of specialist judges sitting in branches or depart-
ments of unified courts. 4 ' Adoption of such legislation is a part of the
State Bar's legislative program for the 1967 session.'" At this writing,
however, it is doubtful that the legislature is willing to assume this $304,-
000 burden. Moreover, so long as no adequate measure for judicial redis-
tricting is adopted, conversion of these courts into district courts may
make it more difficult to add additional courts as needed in the future,
without resorting to specialized courts again. However, adoption of this
legislation in conjunction with other proposed changes would be an im-
portant step toward a unified judicial system.
Suggestion: Enact legislation converting the present juvenile courts and
courts of domestic relations into family district courts with general dis-
trict court jurisdiction.
Probate Courts Section 16 of article V gives the county court exclusive
145 Id. at 271, 276. See also Pound's comments on Texas Bar Association's proposal of 1918, 37
TEX. BAR Ass'N Pi.OCEEIINos 209 (1918).
141TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2338-3 to 2338-20 (1951); See 37 TEX. Civ. JuD.
COUNCIL ANN. REP. 97 (1965).
14aTEX. CONST. art. V, 5 1; Jordan v. Crudgington, 149 Tex. 237, 231 S.W.2d 641 (1950).
"' See, e.g., Rader v. Rader, 378 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) error ref. n.r.e., holding
that the domestic relations court has no jurisdiction of a suit for alienation of affections.
'"Carrington, The Need in Texas for Family District Courts, 27 TEXAs B.J. 567 (1964);
Raggio, Family District Courts, 29 TEXAS B.J. 1007 (1966).
14 5 Supra note 140.
'..Barker, Bar's Legislative Program, 29 TEXAs B.J. 997 (1966).
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jurisdiction of the probate of wills, the appointment of administrators
and guardians, and the administration of estates of deceased persons,
minors, and incompetents. Section 8 gives the district court "appellate
jurisdiction and general control" over the probate court in such matters.
The only procedure for review in the district court of the orders of the
county court is by trial de novo under the same rules and procedure as
other civil cases in the district court.'47 Thus the problems arising from
the limited jurisdiction of a specialized court are compounded by the in-
convenience and expense of double trials of the same issues.
Although the county court has exclusive original jurisdiction to probate
wills, it has no jurisdiction to construe a will,148 or to enforce a contract to
make a will, 149 or to determine the title to real or personal property claimed
by the estate,"' or to decide a claim against an estate after it has been
denied by the executor, administrator or guardian, unless such claim is
within the county court's civil jurisdiction."' Whenever such issues arise,
independent suits must be prosecuted in the district court and the judg-
ment must be certified to the county court for observance."'
On trial de novo the jurisdiction of the district court is purely appel-
late. The issues are confined to the issues made in the county court, and
none of the district court's original jurisdiction can be exercised." For
example, on appeal from an order probating a will, the district court can-
not enter an agreed judgment dividing property of the estate in a differ-
ent manner from that provided in the will because such a judgment is be-
yond the jurisdiction of the probate court."'
When the present constitution was adopted it made sense to commit
probate and administration matters to the county court, which was always
available, rather than to the district court, which met in rural counties
only for a short session twice a year. Since the county judge was not nor-
mally a lawyer, he was not given jurisdiction to decide such important
matters as land titles, and any party dissatisfied with his rulings was guar-
anteed a trial before the district judge at the next term of the district
court. The original justification of this arrangement is not applicable to
urban counties where most of the Texas population now lives. In some
of these counties there are now special probate courts with judges who are
required to be lawyers."' Moreover, the disadvantages of separate probate
147 TEx. R. Civ. P. 337, 350.
.
4 Langenhennig v. Hohmann, 139 Tex. 452, 163 S.W.2d 402 (1942); McCarty v. Duncan,
330 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
14'Huston v. Cole, 139 Tex. 150, 162 S.W.2d 404 (1942).
'"Jones v. Sun Oil Co., 137 Tex. 353, 153 S.W.2d 571 (1941); Brown v. Fleming, 212 S.W.
483 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919); McMahan v. McMahan, 175 S.W. 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915)
error ref.; Berry v. Barnes, 26 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
"' George v. Ryon, 94 Tex. 317, 60 S.W. 427 (1901); Marx v. Freeman, 21 Tex. Civ. App.
429, 52 S.W. 647 (1899).
". Gregory v. Ward, 118 Tex. 526, 18 S.W.2d 1049 (1929); Higginbotham v. Davis, 221
S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 313 (1956).
"' Huston v. Cole, 139 Tex. 150, 162 S.W.2d 404 (1942); In re Martin's Estate, 284 S.W.2d
279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e.
..
4 Pierce v. Foreign Mission Bd., 235 S.W. 552 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921).
"' TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1970-31a, 1970-31b (1964) (Dallas County), art.
1970-110a (1963) (Harris County), art. 1970-345 (1957) (Tarrant County).
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courts remain.'" Chief Justice Alexander proposed that probate matters
be handled by the district courts. 57 This would require a constitutional
amendment,"8 but it would have the two-fold advantage of eliminating
trials de novo and relieving rigid jurisdictional restrictions.
In rural counties the district judge still might not be available as often
as needed in probate matters. A possible solution would be to give the
district court original jurisdiction concurrently with the county court.
Then the probate courts in the larger counties could be converted into
district courts with unlimited jurisdiction, but would continue to spe-
cialize in probate matters, while in the smaller counties the county judge
would be available to handle routine probate proceedings. The supreme
court could then adopt rules of procedure providing for transfer of cer-
tain probate proceedings to the district court. Perhaps these rules would
provide that in counties with several district judges all probate matters
should be filed in the district court, whereas in smaller counties such mat-
ters would be filed in the county courts, but certain contested matters,
such as will contests, would be transferred to the district court,' where
they would be heard as original proceedings in a court of unlimited juris-
diction.
Concurrent jurisdiction in the district court would also provide the
opportunity to assign to the family district court such matters as lunacy
proceedings and appointment of guardians, and would increase the com-
petency of those courts to deal with all aspects of family legal problems.'"
Suggestion: Amend section 8 of article V to give the district court orig-
inal jurisdiction concurrent with the county court in probate, administra-
tion, guardianship, and lunacy proceedings, and to authorize the supreme
court to provide, by rules of procedure, which matters within the concur-
rent jurisdiction should be heard by the county court and which by the
district court. Also, enact legislation converting existing special probate
courts into district courts with unlimited jurisdiction, but giving pref-
erence to probate matters.
Criminal District Courts Specialized criminal courts have a long history
in Texas. The constitution of 1866 authorized the legislature to "establish
criminal courts in the principal cities within the State,''. and the same pro-
vision was carried forward into the reconstruction constitution of 1869.62
The first court of this nature to be established was the criminal district
court for Galveston and Harris Counties."'5 It is not clear why such a spe-
156 POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 179 (1940); Stayton, Texas' Approach to the Parker
Ideal and Her Shortcomings, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 845, 848 (1959).
157 14 TEX. CIv. JUD. COUNCIL ANN. RE'. 26 (1942).
... State v. Gillette's Estate, 10 S.W.2d 984 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1932).
19 The committee who drafted the Probate Code favored this procedure for eliminating dual
trials, but concluded that any statute so providing would be unconstitutional. See interpretative
commentary following TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5 (1955). See also 28 TEX. Csv. JUD. COUNCIL
ANN. REP. 21 (1956).
... On the problem of conflict between the powers of the probate court to appoint a guardiao
of the person and the power of the district court to award custody, see Thomason v. McGeorge,
285 S.W. 285 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926).
...TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1866); 5 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 864, 865 (1866).
1
1 2 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1869); 7 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 410 (1871).163 Act of July 23, 1870, 6 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 211 (1870).
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cial court was considered preferable to another district court with general
jurisdiction. Perhaps legal difficulties were envisioned in having more than
one judicial district within the same county."4
The constitution of 1876 continued the criminal district court of Gal-
veston and Harris Counties because of the greater criminal problem arising
there from the coming ashore of ships' crews, and it was desired "to free
the jails and make justice prompt."' 6 Other criminal district courts in
cities with a population of not less than 30,000 were also authorized. "6 The
amendments of 1891 omitted any particular reference to criminal courts,
except to continue the criminal district court of Galveston and Harris
Counties, but it added a new provision: "The Legislature may establish
such other courts as it may deem necessary and prescribe the jurisdiction
and organization thereof, and may conform the jurisdiction of the district
and other inferior courts thereto."' 07
Under this provision criminal district courts have been created in sev-
eral of the most populous counties. The statutes creating these courts typ-
ically limit their jurisdiction to criminal cases and provide that the regu-
lar district courts should have no criminal jurisdiction. "6 However, at-
tempts to limit the jurisdiction of the other courts have been unsuccessful.
Though the court of criminal appeals expressed the opinion that the
power to "conform the jurisdiction of the other district and other infer-
ior courts" authorized the legislature to give exclusive jurisdiction to the
criminal district courts, " ' the supreme court has repeatedly held that the
legislature cannot reduce the jurisdiction of a constitutional district
court." In Lord v. Clayton,"" the supreme court held that although the
statute creating the 136th District Court of Jefferson County expressly
limited its jurisdiction to civil cases and other legislation purported to
give exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases to the criminal district court
of Jefferson county, the 136th court was nevertheless a constitutional
district court with full power to impanel a grand jury, receive an indict-
ment, and try the accused.
Whatever difficulties may exist in creating district courts with civil
jurisdiction only, it is settled that the constitutional power to establish
"other courts" does authorize the legislature to establish district courts
with criminal jurisdiction only."2 Moreover, criminal district courts may
164 See Wheeler v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 489, 13 S.W. 305 (1890); Lytle v. Halff, 75 Tex. 128,
12 S.W. 610 (1899).
165 See interpretative commentary following TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1.
1 6 TEx. CONST. art. V, § 1; 8 GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 800 (1876).
16. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (as amended 1891).
logTEx. REV. Clv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1926-1 to 1926-63 (Supp. 1966).
6 Cockrell v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 326, 211 S.W. 939 (1919).
1. Lord v. Clayton, 163 Tex. 62, 352 S.W.2d 718 (1961); Ex parte Richards, 137 Tex. 520,
155 S.W.2d 597 (1941); Reasonover v. Reasonover, 122 Tex. 512, 58 S.W.2d 817 (1933); St.
Louis S.W. Ry. v. Hall, 98 Tex. 480, 85 S.W. 786 (1905); See Castro v. State, 124 Tex. Crim.
13, 60 S.W.2d 211 (1933).
171 Ibid.
.. Hull v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 607, 100 S.W. 403 (1907); Cunningham v. City of Corpus
Christi, 260 S.W. 266, 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
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be granted limited jurisdiction over certain types of civil cases, such as
those involving domestic relations and payment of taxes.173
The disadvantages of narrow jurisdictional limitations exist in the case
of special criminal courts, though perhaps not to the same extent as other
specialized courts so long as the jurisdiction is criminal only. In the larger
counties, where these courts exist, there is a sharp division between civil
and criminal practice, and seldom, if ever, is a criminal court hampered
by lack of civil jurisdiction. The principal disadvantage is the lack of
flexibility-that is, the unavailability of the criminal district judge to help
with civil business when needed. If he is given jurisdiction of a limited
class of civil cases, then other difficulties arise, as illustrated by Ex Parte
Richards,74 where it was held that the criminal district court of Willacy
County, in a suit brought within its special jurisdiction over tax collection
suits, did not have jurisdiction of a cross action for injunctive relief.
Recently there has been a trend away from narrow jurisdictional re-
strictions on these courts. The 1963 statute creating one new civil and
one new criminal district court for Dallas County provides:
All of said courts hereby created shall have and exercise, in addition to the
jurisdiction now conferred by law on said Courts, concurrent jurisdiction
coextensive with the limits of Dallas County in all actions, proceedings,
matters and causes both civil and criminal of which District Courts of
general jurisdiction are given jurisdiction by the Constitution and laws of
the State of Texas.
In Bexar County the former criminal district courts have been converted
into the 144th and 175th district courts, and all district courts have con-
current jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases, although it is pro-
vided that the 144th and 175th shall give preference to criminal cases,
and all indictments shall be returned to them. The other seven district
courts are directed to give preference to civil cases, and all civil cases are
directed to be filed in such other courts. 7 '
Because of the division between civil and criminal practice, and the ob-
vious advantages of specialization, it seems likely that the practical dis-
tinction between civil and criminal district courts will continue for the
foreseeable future. However, it may be expected that rigid jurisdictional
lines between the two will continue to disappear, so that the divisions will
bcome purely an administrative matter. Of course, no such jurisdictional
limitation would exist in a unified judicial system.
Suggestion: Enact legislation converting the remaining limited criminal
district courts into full constitutional district courts.
E. Courts of Lesser Jurisdiction
County Courts In each of the 254 counties of Texas there is a constitu-
'"Ex parte Richards, 137 Tex. 520, 155 S.W.2d 597 (1941).
174 Ibid.
175TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 199(162) (Supp. 1966).
1 6 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 199(37) (Supp. 1966). Also, in Travis County, the crimi-
nal district court, which already had civil jurisdiction, was renamed the 147th district court. TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 199(153) (1955), art. 1926-51 (1923), art. 199(147) (1963).
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tional county court, presided over by a county judge, who is supposed to
be "learned in the law," but who is not required to be a lawyer."' Under the
constitution the county court has original jurisdiction of misdemeanors
where the fine to be imposed may exceed $200.00, exclusive jurisdiction in
civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeds $200.00 but is not
more than $500.00, concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in civil
cases in which the amount exceeds $ 500.00 but is not more than $1,000.00,
appellate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases of which justice
courts have original jurisdiction, and general probate jurisdiction, includ-
ing wills, administration of estates, guardianships and lunacy proceedings." 8
An element of flexibility is provided by section 22: "The Legislature shall
have power, by local or general law, to increase, diminish or change the
civil and criminal jurisdiction of County Courts, and in cases of any such
change of jurisdiction, the Legislature shall also conform the jurisdiction
of the other courts to such change." Under this section the county courts
have been given jurisdiction over appeals from municipal corporation
courts7 and original jurisdiction in statutory eminent domain proceedings
without regard to the amount in controversy.
8 0
Section 22 has been held to authorize the legislature to increase the
jurisdiction of the county court by giving it jurisdiction concurrent with
the justices of the peace,' and also to take away civil and criminal juris-
diction of the county court and transfer it to the district court.' This
power to diminish or increase the jurisdiction of the county courts in par-
ticular counties has been exercised frequently by the legislature.18 ' The
power does not extend to probate matters, which have been held to be
neither "civil" nor "criminal" within section 22; consequently, the pro-
bate jurisdiction of the county court is said to be exclusive."' However,
other courts with concurrent probate jurisdiction may be established if no
attempt is made to deprive the constitutional county court of its probate
jurisdiction."'
In providing additional judges to handle county court litigation, the
legislature has not attempted to increase the number of judges of the con-
stitutional county courts, perhaps because section 15 provides for the elec-
tion in each county of "a county judge" who is also made presiding officer
of the county commissioners' court by section 18."' Consequently, separate
courts have been created under the power granted in the last paragraph of
'..TEx. CONST. art. V, § 15 (as amended 1954).
.. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 16 (as amended 1891).
'
7 9 TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 45.10 (1965); Hickman v. State, 79 Tex. Crim. 125,
183 S.W. 1180 (1916); Taylor County v. Jarvis, 209 S.W. 405 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919).
'..TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3266 (1941). Pearson v. State, 159 Tex. 66, 315 S.W.2d
935 (1958); Southern Kan. Ry. v. Vance, 104 Tex. 90, 133 S.W. 1043 (1911).
18' Gulf, W.T. & P. Ry. v. Fromme, 98 Tex. 459, 84 S.W. 1054 (1905); White v. Barrow,
182 S.W. 1155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
.. Muench v. Oppenheimer, 86 Tex. 568, 26 S.W. 496 (1894); Chappell v. State, 153 Tex.
Crim. 237, 219 S.W.2d 88 (1949).
s18 TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-141a (1951); See particularly TEX. REV. Civ. STAr.
ANN. art. 1970-310 (1964).
'
8 4 State v. Gillette's Estate, 10 S.W.2d 984 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928).
... State v. McClelland, 148 Tex. 372, 224 S.W.2d 706 (1949).
.. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 15, 18 (as amended 1954).
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section 1 to "establish such other courts as it may deem necessary and pre-
scribe the jurisdiction and organization thereof." A whole class of statu-
tory courts has been formed, upon each of which the legislature has con-
ferred some portion of the jurisdiction of the constitutional county courts.
These courts have various names and a wide variety of jurisdictional re-
restrictions. The earliest seems to have been the County Court of Dallas
County at Law, established in 1907, with "concurrent jurisdiction with
the County Court of Dallas County in all matters and causes, civil and
criminal, original and appellate," except probate matters, which were re-
served to the county court."7 Additional courts have since been added, so
that now there are in Dallas County ten statutory county courts: four
"County Courts of Dallas County at Law" with civil jurisdiction only
(including eminent domain),"' three "County Criminal Courts" with
criminal jurisdiction only,"' a "County Criminal Court of Appeals" with
sole jurisdiction over appeals in criminal matters from justice and corpora-
tion courts, as well as concurrent jurisdiction in other criminal cases,'"
and two probate courts."' The constitutional county court, though it still
technically has jurisdiction concurrent with that of all the statutory
courts, has ceased to exist as an operating court. The county judge is oc-
cupied with his administrative duties as presiding officer of the commis-
sioner's court, which is not really a court, but rather the governing body
of the county; but he hears mental illness cases, as do the two probate
judges.
At the end of the 1965 session of the legislature there were forty-seven
statutory county courts existing in nineteen counties. 9' Although the sta-
tutes establishing these courts generally authorize the judges of courts of
like jurisdiction in the same county to transfer cases, exchange benches,
and sit for each other,a' they are distinct tribunals, as illustrated by cases
holding that one county court at law cannot set aside an execution sale had
in another,'" and that one court has no jurisdiction of a condemnation
case upon filing of objections to the award of special commissioners ap-
pointed by the judge of another court."'
There has been some confusion as to just what kind of courts these are.
In State ex. rel. Peden v. Valentine". it was held that the act creating the
"County Court at Law of Tarrant County for Civil Cases" was uncon-
stitutional insofar as it authorized the governor to appoint the judge to fill
a vacancy because the court was essentially a constitutional county court
117 TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 1970-1 to 1970-14 (1907).
". TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-15 (1917), art. 1970-31.1 (1963).
'
89
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-31.10 (1927), art. 31.11 (1951), art. 31.12 (1959).
'"0TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-31.20 (1961).
"'.TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-31a (1951), art. 1970-31(b) (1963).
19 37 TEX. CIV. JUD. COUNCIL ANN. REP. 99 (1965).
"9aSee, e.g., TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-31.1, §§ 2, 8 (1963) (county courts of
Dallas County at law), art. 1970-31b, § 10 (1963) (probate courts of Dallas County), art.
1970-31.20, §§ 14, 15 (1961) (county criminal courts of Dallas County).
'Sharp v. Yniquez, 324 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
"'.Henderson v. Texas Turnpike Authority, 308 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
'"198 S.W. 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917); See Johnson v. City of Dallas, 78 S.W.2d 265
(Tex. Civ. App. 1934); City of Dallas v. Johnson, 54 S.W.2d 1024 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
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with limited jurisdiction, not a court "other" than those named in the
constitution. Consequently, the judge was a county officer, and the ap-
pointment had to be made by the commissioners' court under article V, sec-
tion 28. Though a judge of such a court may be a "county officer," he is
not a constitutional "county judge," and the better view seems to be that
these courts are "other courts" under section 1 of article V. 9 7 The im-
portance of this latter view is that "other courts" created under section 1
do not have to conform to the pattern of the constitutional courts. It has
been contended that although the legislature can establish special district
courts to exercise part of the jurisdiction of the constitutional district
courts and can establish special county courts with part of the jurisdiction
of the constitutional county courts, it cannot create courts of a wholly
different kind. This argument was laid to rest in Jordan v. Crudgington,99
where the supreme court upheld the validity of the Potter County Court
of Domestic Relations and declared that the legislature had power under
section 1 to establish a "family of courts" different from those specifically
defined in the constitution. Thus we may assume that the further evolu-
tion of the statutory county courts will not be hampered by constitutional
inhibitions.
In examining the statutes establishing these courts, one is struck by
the minute detail of their administrative provisions, which vary from
county to county. In Dallas County, for instance, civil cases must be
filed in rotation in the county courts at law, but the judges are directed to
equalize the dockets at least once a year."' In Tarrant County, filings in
the two county criminal courts are alternated by the month.' There is a
provision that civil cases in Tarrant County may be filed in either of the
two county courts at law, but it is not clear whether this supersedes an
earlier statute authorizing the commissioners' court to prescribe the ratio
in which cases are docketed in these courts."'1 In Harris County civil cases
must be filed in the two county civil courts at law alternately, and crim-
inal cases must be filed in the four county criminal courts in rotation."'
In Bexar County all criminal cases must be filed in the Bexar County Court
for Criminal Cases, all eminent domain and mental health cases must be
filed in the county civil court at law, and other cases in rotation in the
three county courts at law."' In Galveston County, probate matters, men-
tal illness cases and condemnation cases are filed in the County Court No.
2 or in the Constitutional County Court, and all other civil and criminal
cases are filed in the County Court No. 1. ' In Nueces County there are
two county courts at law with concurrent civil and criminal jurisdiction,
"97Allen v. State, 122 Tex. Crim. 186, 54 S.W.2d 810 (1932); Sterrett v. Morgan, 294
S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
"8 14 9 Tex. 237, 231 S.W.2d 641 (1950).
199 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-31.1, § 3 (1963).
1
°TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-62b, § 13 (1961).
0 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT." ANN. art. 1970-58 (1907), art. 1970-59 (1925).
20 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-110c.1, § 10 (1963), art. 1970-110d(h) (1961).
"'TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-75a, art. 1970-301f, S 4, art. 1970-301g, § 2
(Supp. 1966).
' TE. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-342a, § 3 (Supp. 1966).
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but all criminal cases of original jurisdiction must be docketed in one,
while all civil cases and criminal cases appealed from inferior courts must
be docketed in the other."0'
The foregoing demonstrates how minutely the administration of these
courts has been regulated. It is not clear why such detailed regulations
have been thought necessary. If the judges of these courts are capable of
deciding the matters of law and fact that come before them in contested
litigation, apparently they should also be capable of making sound deci-
sions concerning the administration of the business of their courts. Pre-
sumably they know more about that business than anyone else. The same
considerations which have brought about the demand for freeing courts in
general from detailed procedural legislation and transferring the rule-
making function to the supreme court would seem to apply here.
There is some evidence of the beginning of a trend toward more au-
tonomy for county court judges. In 1965 the legislature created a second
county court at law for Jefferson County and provided that all cases, civil
and criminal, should be docketed in such manner as may be determined
by the judges of the two courts.' In the same year the legislature replaced
a similar provision for the county courts at law of Bexar County with a
mandatory rotational filing requirement, but authorized a majority of the
judges to adopt rules of practice and elect a presiding judge with authority
to assign any pending case to another court and to assign any judge to
another court to try a pending case.""
These statutory courts need not conform to the constitutional pattern
and their organization is subject to legislative control. Moreover, since the
legislation affecting these courts is local in character and does not involve
the appropriation of any state funds, no opposition is normally encoun-
tered where the legislators from the county in question are in agreement.
Consequently, the opportunity exists to establish a unified court on a local
basis. If such a reorganization is made in one county and is well accepted,
other counties may be expected to follow suit.
Such a local court reorganization can be carried out to whatever extent
is necessary. If complete unification is desired, there is apparently no legal
obstacle to replacing all of the statutory courts in one county with a
single county court at law, of which all the incumbent judges would be
members, including possibly the county judge as well, although the con-
stitutional county court would continue to exist in theory as a separate
court with concurrent jurisdiction. The unified county court at law would
have all the jurisdiction conferred by the constitution or by statute on
constitutional county courts, and such other jurisdiction as the legislature
might determine, and would have authority, by a majority vote of its
judges, to adopt rules governing the administration of its business and to
elect a presiding judge with authority to carry such rules into effect. Under
such rules the business of the court could be organized, if desired, into
...TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-339a, §§ 3, 19 (1954).
'O"TEx. REv. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-126a, § 4 (Supp. 1966).
...TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-75a (Supp. 1966), superseding former art. 1970-301d,
§ 3, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1957).
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separate civil, criminal, appellate, eminent domain, probate, and mental
health divisions; and judges would be assigned to such divisions adminis-
tratively upon consideration of their experience and the requirements of
pending litigation. Such assignments would be modified from time to time
as circumstances might require. Since the county commissioners are the
governing body of the county and have responsibility for providing the
funds to operate the county courts, they may properly be given authority
to increase or reduce the number of judges, but authority to reduce the
number should probably be limited to the occurrence of vacancies in the
membership of the court. Ultimately, if it is desired to integrate the county
courts into a unified judicial system, it may be appropriate to give the pre-
siding judge of the administrative judicial district authority to appoint a
presiding judge with statutory power to transfer cases and assign judges.
Suggestion: Enact a local law in one or more metropolitan counties re-
placing all statutory county courts with a single county court at law, of
which all judges of these courts would be members, with concurrent juris-
diction of all matters of which the constitutional county court has juris-
diction. Authorize the county commissioners' court to increase the number
of judges or to reduce the number when vacancies occur, as needed. Em-
power a majority of the judges to elect a presiding judge and to adopt rules
providing for the administration of business and the assignment of
judges. Alternatively, provide for appointment of the presiding judge of
the county court at law by the presiding judge of the administrative ju-
dicial district and give him statutory power to transfer cases and assign
judges.
Small Causes and Petty Offenses In Texas justices of the peace have
jurisdiction in civil cases where the amount in controversy is not more than
$200.00 and in criminal cases where the fine to be imposed may not be
more than $200.00. °' Corporation courts have jurisdiction of criminal
cases arising under municipal ordinances and have concurrent jurisdiction
with the justices of the peace in other criminal cases arising within the
territorial limits of the municipality.""
There is probably more widespread dissatisfaction with the administra-
tion of justice in small causes and petty offenses, particularly traffic cases,
than in any other aspect of the judicial system. The cause of this dissatis-
faction is the quality of justice administered by untrained, poorly paid and
often part-time justices of the peace, as well as by lay judges of corpora-
tion courts in the smaller municipalities."' The poor quality of justice in
these courts seems to be assumed by provisions for appeal and trial de novo
of all issues in the county courts."'
"0TEX. CONST. art. V, § 19.
...TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1195 (1899).
210 POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS, 260 (1940); Litke, The Modernization of the Minor
Courts, 50 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 67 (1966); McCormick, Modernizing the Texas Judicial System,
21 TEXAS L. REV. 674, 688 (1943); Randolph, Local Option Abolition of Justice Courts, 25
TEXAS B.J. 15, 16 (1962); Uhlenhopp, Some Plain Talk About Courts of Special and Limited
Jurisdiction, 49 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 212 (1966).




Roscoe Pound has pointed out that the amount of money involved in a
case does not necessarily determine the difficulty of the case or the amount
of learning, skill, and experience which should be applied to determine it;
that it is feasible to administer a much higher grade of justice than that
dispensed by justices of the peace without resorting to the more expensive
methods of the superior courts; and that judges assigned to small causes
should be of such caliber that they would command the respect and con-
fidence of the public, and so that no retrial would be necessary on
appeal. 1 '
Abolition of justices of the peace has been an interest of the Texas bar
as far back as the Texas Bar Association's court reorganization plan of
1918. Samuel Dabney, in proposing the plan to the association, said: "We
have no sympathy with the idea so prevalent in Texas: Ignorant man,
ignorant judge to try his case-poor man, poor judge-little litigant, little
judge. That we propose to abolish absolutely. However small a litigant
may be, or however small the amount involved, he is entitled to an ade-
quate judge....
In 1960 Paul Carrington, as President of the State Bar of Texas ap-
pointed a special committee, which was reappointed the following year by
President William C. Kerr. This committee drafted a constitutional amend-
ment that would permit local option replacement of justice courts by
courts of record with jurisdiction concurrent with both justice and coun-
ty courts, except for probate jurisdiction.14 The proposal was approved by
a vote of 4,532 to 1,012 in a referendum by members of the state bar."'
It was included in the state bar's legislative program for 1963,1' but was
buried in a subcommittee of the House of Representatives as a result of
"small but vocal opposition" by justices of the peace, constables, and sher-
iffs.2
17
Since this defeat the state bar has adopted a different tactic to deal with
the problem of traffic courts. In 1965, and again in 1967, the state bar has
included in its legislative program the creation of traffic courts of record.
Two companion bills have been proposed, one for a county-wide traffic
court to be activated on order of the county commissioners' court, and the
other for a municipal traffic court to be established by the governing body
of any city with a population of more than 50,000. The county traffic
court would have jurisdiction concurrent with county courts, county
courts at law, and county criminal courts of all cases involving motor
vehicles, including registration, certificates of title, operators' licenses, driv-
ing while intoxicated, and of appeals from corporations and justice courts
in traffic cases. The municipal court would have exclusive original juris-
212 POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 279 (1940). See also Report of the Special Committee
To Suggest Remedies and Formulate Proposed Laws To Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in
Litigation, 34 A.B.A. REP. 578, 591 (1909).
21 37 TEx. BAR Assoc. PROCEEDINGS 145 (1918).
214 Suggested Legislation for Local Abolition of Justice Courts, 25 TEXAS B.J. 16 (1962);
Rudolph, "Local Option" Abolition of Justice Courts, 25 TEXAS B.J. 1021 (1962).
25 25 TEXAS B.J. 281 (1962).
21625 TEXAS B.J. 951 (1962).
211 Improving Justice Court Justice, 26 TEXAS B.J. 522 (1963).
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diction within the territorial limits of the city of all misdemeanors arising
under traffic and motor vehicle laws, and exclusive appellate jurisdiction
in all other criminal cases of which the corporation courts have original
jurisdiction. "'
The proposed county traffic court would be simply another specialized
statutory county court. Establishment of such a court would not affect
trials in justice and corporation courts, or eliminate trials de novo. There is
no reason why a court of general jurisdiction could not handle the same
cases and be available to handle other cases as well. The proposed munici-
pal court would be able to handle all types of traffic misdemeanors, in-
cluding cases now tried in the county courts as well as those now tried in
the corporation courts. Trials de novo would be eliminated in traffic cases,
but other cases would still be tried in the corporation courts with trials
de novo in the municipal court, and the municipal court would not be
available to try any other kind of misdemeanor cases.
As an alternative to such specialized courts, consideration may be given
to bringing all misdemeanors and all civil cases below the district court
level within the jurisdiction of statutory county courts of general juris-
diction and providing as many properly qualified judges as may be neces-
sary. It has been noted that the legislature has power under section 22 of
article V to give the county courts jurisdiction concurrent with the jus-
tice courts in both civil and criminal cases. 1' Statutory county courts now
have jurisdiction concurrent with that of the justice courts in several
counties."' Such statutory courts of record would be available to try all
small causes and petty offenses, and there would be no occasion for trials
de novo. The only appeal would be to the court of civil appeals or court
of criminal appeals in cases within their respective jurisdictions. Depend-
ing upon the amount involved, a simplified procedure and reduced costs
might be available. Thus in small causes the county court could sit as a
small claims court, as the justice courts are now authorized to do."2'
Even though small causes and petty offenses were triable in a centralized
county court, the legislature could authorize the judges to ride circuit
and hold court in the different justice precincts of the county. In this
manner, effect could still be given to statutes concerning venue of cases
in the justice courts." District courts must hold their regular terms at the
county seat, and any attempt to establish a court with district court jur-
isdiction elsewhere may offend the constitutional provision forbidding re-
.. Barker, Bar's Legislative Program, 29 TEXAs B.J. 999 (1966); Eskew, Public Enemy No. 1,
29 TEXAs B.J. 1009 (1966); Eskew, Traffic Courts of Record, County-Wide and Metropolitan,
27 TEXAS B.J. 957 (1964); Shook, State Bar Board of Directors Adopt Legislative Program, 27
TEXAs B.J. 933, 934 (1964); and copies of proposed bills obtained from office of State Bar.
219Gulf, W.T. & P. Ry. v. Fromme, 98 Tex. 459, 84 S.W. 1054 (1905); White v. Barrow,
182 S.W. 1155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
22 TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970-305, § 3 (1959) (Cameron County), art. 1970-311a,
§ 3 (1955) (Potter County), art. 1970-339, § 3 (1955) (Nueces County), art. 1970-34, § 3
(1925) (Tarrant County), art. 1970-340.1, § 3 (1957) (Lubbock County), art. 1970-347, 5 3
(1959) (Nolan County).
222TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2460a (1964).




moval of the county seat without the required vote of the people of the
county."e However, these restrictions probably do not apply to county
courts, and certainly not to cases within the jurisdiction of the justice
courts.
Justices of the peace are constitutional officers. Each county must be
divided by the commissioners' court into not less than four nor more than
eight precincts, and in each precinct where there is a city of more than
8,000 inhabitants, two justices of the peace must be elected.'" Consequent-
ly, the office of justice of the peace cannot be abolished without constitu-
tional amendment. However, the legislature has power over the salaries
paid to justices of the peace. It is reasonable to assume that when a statu-
tory court of record with a properly qualified judge is made available to
try small causes and petty offenses without the necessity of trials de novo,
the justice courts will gradually be displaced, and can eventually be abol-
ished. In this connection notice may be taken of a general trend over the
country to abolish justices of the peace and replace them with courts of
record. 25 Though efforts at abolition have failed so far in Texas, such
efforts would have a better chance of success after more efficient courts
with better qualified judges have taken over a substantial part of their
functions.
Of course there Will be a need for additional judges of the statutory
county courts to take over the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace, and
it may be advisable to make incumbent justices eligible for appointment
to such courts.
In case of the corporation courts, there is no constitutional difficulty,
since they are statutory "other courts" created under section 1 of article
V.25 The problems here arise out of the fact that the judges are usually
selected by the governing body of the city rather than by popular election
and the fines assessed constitute a substantial source or revenue. In the
smaller municipalities it would seem that relieving the towns of the ex-
pense of maintaining their own courts and paying their own judges, while
continuing the fines from the same cases as a source of municipal revenue,
should neutralize any serious municipal objection.
In the event a unified county court at law is established in the county
as previously suggested, the legislation proposed would simply add small
223 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 7, art. IX, § 2; Turner v. Tucker, 113 Tex. 434, 258 S.W. 149
(1924); Wheeler v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 489, 13 S.W. 305 (1890).
224 TEx. CONST. art. V, § 18.
12' The office of justice of the peace no longer exists in fourteen states, including Virginia,
Ohio, Connecticut, North Carolina, Illinois, Colorado, Michigan, and Maine. They have been de-
prived of constitutional status in Montana and Idaho, have been replaced by other courts on a
local basis in Tennessee, and in Kansas their civil jurisdiction has been reduced to $1.00. INST.
JUD. ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAw 607 (1965); INST. JUD. ADMINIS-
TRATION, ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 651 (1963); INST. JUD. ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL
SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 714 (1962); Court Reorganization Reform-1962, 46 J. AM. JuD.
Soc'Y 110 (1962); Pettengill, Court Reorganization Success in Connecticut, 58 A.B.A.J. 58
(1960); Shannon, Judicial Reform for Colorado Courts of Special Jurisdiction, 50 J. AM. JuD.
Soc'y 16 (1966); Winters, The National Movement To Improve the Administration of Justice,
48 J. AM. JUD. SOC'Y 17 (1963).
...TEx. REV. Cirv. STAT. ANN. arts. 1194-1200a (1955); Harris County v. Stewart, 91 Tex.
133, 41 S.W. 650 (1897).
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claims, traffic and petty offense divisions to the other divisions of the uni-
fied court.
Suggestion: By separate statutes applicable to such counties as may de-
sire courts of record for small causes and petty offenses, extend the juris-
diction of the statutory county courts to include jurisdiction in civil and
criminal cases concurrent with that of the justices of the peace and con-
current with that of the corporation courts. Authorize transfer of cases
to such statutory courts, provide for additional judges where needed, and
make incumbent justices of the peace eligible for appointment.
Municipal Courts of Record In proposing the establishment of municipal
traffic courts of record in cities with more than 50,000 inhabitants, the
state bar has recognized that municipal authorities would not willingly
give up their corporation courts in favor of a county wide court. How-
ever, from the point of view of sound judicial administration, there is no
reason why municipal courts of record should be limited to traffic cases.
Statutory municipal courts could well have jurisdiction of all misdemean-
ors committed within the city limits, whether such misdemeanors would
now fall within the jurisdiction of corporation, justice, or county courts.2 7
Trials de novo could then be eliminated in all cases, court reporters could
be made available, and appeals could be taken to the court of criminal
appeals, as appeals now lie from cases tried de novo in the county criminal
courts. Civil jurisdiction in motor vehicle licensing and registration cases
could also be added. Ultimately it may be desired to merge such a munici-
pal court of record with a unified county court at law.
Suggestion: Enact legislation authorizing the governing bodies of cities
having more than 50,000 inhabitants to establish municipal courts of rec-
ord, each with one or more judges, with jurisdiction of all misdemeanors
within their corporate limits, and of all civil cases involving registration
and titles of motor vehicles and licensing of operators.
F. Auxiliary Personnel
District Court Commissioners Several states have constitutional and stat-
utory provisions which authorize commissioners appointed by the judges to
perform a wide variety of functions subject to revision by a judge."2 In
227 34 A.B.A. REP. 578 (1909).
228 CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 authorizes the legislature to provide for appointment by the
superior courts of commissioners "with authority to perform chamber business of the judges of
the superior courts, to take depositions, and to perform such other business connected with the
administration of justice as may be prescribed by law." Under this provision commissioners are
authorized by statute to hear and determine ex parte motions for orders and writs, except injunc-
tions, to take proof and report his findings as to any matter upon which information is required
by the court, to take and approve bonds, to act as judge pro tempore when properly appointed for
that purpose, to hear and report findings and conclusions in preliminary matters concerning custody
and support of children when so ordered by the court, and to hear, report on and determine all
uncontested actions and proceedings other than actions for divorce or annulment of marriages
when ordered to do so by the court. CAL. CODE CIv. P. §§ 259, 259a (Deering 1959). And it
has been held that a court commissioner has authority to approve or reject probate claims. In re
Roberts' Estate, 49 Cal. App. 2d 11, 120 P.2d 933 (1942).
In Washington commissioners appointed by the superior courts have authority concurrently
with that of the superior courts to hear and determine various matters, including all matters in
probate, defaults, adoption and other ex parte proceedings, commitment of persons to mental hos-
pitals and commitments of minors to the state reform school, and may act as referee on any matter
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the larger counties of Texas probate judges have long had administrative
assistants who handle routine matters and frequently act in at least a
quasi-judicial capacity, although they have no statutory authority. It may
be desirable to extend this practice and give it a legal basis, particularly if
the district court is to have original jurisdiction in probate proceedings.
Conservation of judicial manpower would be promoted if the judge
were able to delegate routine matters to a qualified assistant chosen by
him. Besides the many non-contested matters arising in the administration
of estates, various other routine judicial functions could be delegated, such
as examining papers and hearing proof of damages in default cases, re-
moval of disabilities, workmen's compensation settlements, application for
increase or reduction in child support payments, applications for modifi-
cation of visitation privileges, fixing bail and issuing writs of habeas cor-
pus in criminal cases, and so on. The judge would establish general policy
and the assistant would carry out the policy under his supervision. The
judge would be available for consultation on difficult questions, and could
hear a matter himself if he should think proper or if requested by counsel.
The person selected to provide this kind of assistance would have to be
a lawyer employed on a regular basis and appointed by the district judge
or by the district judges collectively, and would have the legal status of a
court commissioner. Such a commissioner would be available to serve as a
master in chancery under rule 171. " ' This rule is not used often because
of the expense of a special master, which is taxed as costs. From the liti-
gant's point of view there is little to be gained by incurring the expense
of a hearing before a special master who has no power of adjudication,
when the same matter can be heard and decided by a judge paid by the
state. However, the rule would probably be used more often if a salaried
commissioner were available to hear evidence on issues involving detailed
data, and make a report to the judge, who then would need to hear evi-
dence only on matters specified in objections to the report.'
The main problem in this connection is to determine which functions
should be delegated and which should be reserved for the judge himself.
as ordered by the court. All acts of the commissioners are subject to revision by the superior court
on written demand, and revision is on the record of the case, rather than upon evidence taken
anew. Unless the demand for revision is made within ten days, the commissioner's order becomes
the judgment of the court. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 23; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. SS 2.24.010-
2.24.060 (1961 and Supp. 1966).
Other states have various provisions authorizing the appointment of court commissioners and
defining their powers. Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 27.100, 395.520, 395.525 (1962); Michigan:
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.1022 (1962); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 252.14 (Supp. 1967).
Masters in chancery for domestic relations matters are authorized by local court rule in Virginia.
Raiford v. Raiford, 193 Va. 221, 68 S.E.2d 888 (1952).
2 2
TEx. R. Cxv. P. 171.
2"Former art. 2338-2a, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1949). In Texas an experience with a
standing officer to assist with work ordinarily done by a judge has been the referee formerly em-
ployed in the juvenile court of Harris County. By statute the judge of the juvenile court was
authorized to refer to the referee any case before him involving dependent, neglected or delinquent
children for hearing evidence, making findings of fact, and recommending judgment to be entered.
Apparently this arrangement was not entirely satisfactory, since in 1965 the statute was repealed
and a new juvenile court was created. TEx. REV. Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-18 (Supp. 1966).
See similar statute authorizing district judges of Wichita County to appoint special referees in
juvenile and domestic relations matters, with compensation to be paid by litigants if they are able.
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-2b (Supp. 1966).
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Serious objection may be raised to having adjudicatory functions per-
formed by anyone besides a judge. Ideally, most contested matters should
be reserved for the judge, except highly standardized proceedings which
may be heard and determined under guidelines set by the judge, and ex-
cept for unusual cases such as would authorize appointment of a special
master under rule 171. Ordinarily, there is little value in presenting a con-
tested matter before a commissioner, since his rulings would be subject to
revision by the judge, and it would usually be better presenting it to the
judge in the first instance. Only a serious shortage of judges would justify
extensive use of commissioners to hear contested matters. On the other
hand, in non-contested matters a commissioner could handle a large vol-
ume of business that need never come to the judge's attention at all except
in those few cases where an interested party comes in and demands a hear-
ing.
If the determination by the commissioner amounts only to a recom-
mendation to the judge, who must himself sign any binding order, it would
be possible to define the functions of the commissioner by statute, or per-
haps by rule of court. However, in order to make full use of the com-
missioner's services it should be possible to make certain classes of his or-
ders final and binding in the absence of timely objection by an interested
party. This result could probably only be accomplished by a constitution-
al amendment," and if such an amendment is to be adopted, it would be
appropriate to authorize the supreme court to define the powers of the
commissioners as well as to prescribe the procedure applicable.
Suggestion: Amend article V by adding a section 7a, which would pro-
vide that district judges may appoint commissioners to whom they may
delegate such of their judicial and ministerial functions as the supreme
court may determine and define by rule, and adopt a rule of civil proce-
dure to implement such amendment. Alternatively, enact a statute to the
same effect and adopt a rule of procedure which would define the more
limited powers such a statutory commissioner would be authorized to
exercise.
Administrative Staff The existing pattern of judicial administration in
Texas, so far as it goes, is to impose administrative duties on judges who
are already engaged full-time in the regular duties of their courts. The
suggestions considered above would preserve this pattern, but would im-
pose additional responsibilities on the chief justice, the presiding adminis-
trative judges, and the local presiding judges. It is not to be expected that
these judges could perform all the details of administration personally
without impairment of their regular judicial responsibilities, but it is
essential to keep full control of administrative procedures within the ju-
diciary. Consequently, it would be necessary to provide them an admin-
.. Morrow v. Corbin, 122 Tex. 553, 62 S.W.2d 641, 645 (1933); Brown v. Bay City Bank
& Trust Co., 161 S.W. 23 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Southern Oil Co. v. Wilson, 22 Tex. Civ. App.
534, 56 S.W. 429 (1900); and see TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. V-846 (1949) holding that House
Bill 912, 51st Legislature, which proposed to authorize the county court to appoint a master in
chancery to perform the probate duties exclusively required of the judge of the county court was
in violation of TEX. CoNsT. art. V, § 16.
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istrative staff which would attend to the details of administration under
their direct supervision.
Beginning with the establishment of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts in 1939, 32 provisions for staff assistance for judges
charged with responsibility for court administration have been wide-
spread. Over twenty states have some sort of court administrator," and
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has
drawn up a Model Act to provide for an administrator for the state
courts. In 1943 Chief Justice Alexander called for establishment of such
an agency in Texas, " and the Texas Civil Judicial Council has had the
proposal under study." In 1961 a bill originating with a state bar com-
mittee was introduced for the purpose of creating a court administrator
to be attached to and directed by the supreme court, but this bill was re-
jected in favor of amendments to strengthen article 200a by giving the
chief justice authority to make inter-district assignments and to pay as-
signed judges an extra stipend. 7
Under present administrative procedures, it is doubtful whether full
advantage could be taken of the services of a court administrator. How-
ever, if the administrative structure were strengthened along the lines here
suggested, staff assistance would be essential to effective administrative su-
pervision. It may be better to avoid the term "court administrator," since
it may have the connotation of judges taking orders from a non-judicial
functionary. All supervisory authority should remain in the hands of the
chief justice, the presiding administrative judges and the local presiding
judges, who would perform their supervisory duties with assistance of a
competent administrative staff.
Rather than establish a general administrative office for all Texas courts,
it would be more in keeping with the Texas pattern of administration to
authorize the chief justice and each of the presiding administrative judges
to employ an administrative assistant. The administrative assistant to the
chief justice would serve as secretary to the Judicial Council and take
over the statistical reporting function of the Council. The administrative
assistant to the presiding administrative judge would have his office in the
courthouse of the major city within the administrative district, and would
be available to render assistance to the local presiding judge in performing
his administrative responsibilities. Each of the administrative assistants
would have clerical personnel under his supervision, and the administra-
tive assistant to the chief justice would also have a competent research
assistant.
Suggestion: Amend article 200a to authorize the employment of an ad-
ministrative assistant by the chief justice and employment of a similar
23253 Stat. 1123 (1939), 28 U.S.C. § 332-33 (1964).
2 
INST. JUD. ADMINISTRATION, COURT ADMINISTRATION, app. B (1959).
' ABA JUD. ADMINISTRATION SECTION, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 27 (1949).
235Alexander, An Administrative Agency for the Texas Courts, 27 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 90
(1943).
23' 32 TEx. CIV. Jun. COUNCIL ANN. REP. 21 (1960).2
11Chadick, Obscurity Can Be an Asset, 25 TEXAS B.J. 189 (1962).
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assistant by the presiding judge of each of the nine administrative judicial
districts, together with necessary clerical personnel. Amend article 2328a
to make the administrative assistant to the chief justice the ex officio sec-
retary of the Judicial Council, and give him or the chief justice authority
to gather statistics from all courts, both civil and criminal.
V. PROSPECT
The suggestions considered in this article have not been advanced as a
program of immediate action for the state bar or any other group con-
cerned about court reorganization. No attempt has been made to determine
whether any of them would be acceptable to the bench, the bar, or the
public. The purpose, rather, has been to indicate how the essential fea-
tures of a unified court system may be achieved within the framework of
our present judicial structure.
From the long-range point of view, this prospect emerges: a unified
county court at law for all misdemeanors and all civil cases below the
district court level; a unified district court with civil, criminal, family,
juvenile, mental health, probate and appellate divisions; a board of man-
agers of the entire system consisting of the chief justice and nine adminis-
trative judges appointed by him with power to establish, rearrange and
discontinue judgeships; a chief justice with authority to assign any dis-
trict or appellate judge to sit temporarily in any court; nine administra-
tive judges appointed by the chief justice, with authority to make assign-
ments within their districts; a local presiding judge in each of the larger
counties, appointed by the administrative judge, with authority to assign
judges and transfer cases; and adequate administrative personnel to assist
the chief justice, administrative judges, and local presiding judges with
their administrative tasks, as well as to keep statistical records upon which
administrative decisions may be based. This picture is very nearly that pro-
jected by the special committee of the American bar in 1909,238 and ap-
proximates the structure delineated in the Model State Judicial Article in
1962.
Whatever the merits of such a unified system, it is not likely to be ac-
cepted in Texas as a single package. Concerning judicial reform, Judge
Harold Medina has said: "A quick, sudden, revolutionary change is pos-
sible but unusual, almost as rare as hen's teeth. Unless you have some
strong political support, the changes must always be effected by the evo-
lutionary process. '
One reason why general court reform programs, however carefully
prepared, have never drawn sufficient support from the bar and from the
public in Texas is that the evolutionary process of specific changes as
needed has thus far prevented docket congestion from getting bad enough
to create a demand for drastic reforms. Another reason is that proposals
2" 8 7 A.B.A. REP. 130, 392 (1962); 47 J. AM. JUD. Soc'y 8 (1963).
23 Ibid.
m Medina, Improving the Administration of Justice-Evolution or Revolution, 47 J. AM.
Jun. Soc'Y 51 (1963).
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of multiple reforms in a single package tend to unite the opponents of
each specific change proposed into a solid phalanx of opposition to the
entire proposal. Also, such proposals in the past have involved highly con-
troversial features, such as changes in the method of selecting judges,
which have tended to obscure the merits of proposed changes which might
otherwise be more readily accepted.
That further changes will come in Texas judicial organization cannot
be doubted. That any of the specific changes suggested here will actually
be adopted cannot be confidently predicted. It seems highly probable, how-
ever, that the reforms which do come will be of a similar evolutionary
nature. That is to say, they will be directed to specific needs and be cap-
able of standing on their separate merits rather than being included as
elements of a general program of reform, and in perspective they will
tend toward the principles of unification, flexibility, and responsible su-
pervision within the judiciary which are characteristic of a modern ju-
dicial system.
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